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RETHINKING LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY 
KIRSTEN MATOY CARLSON* 
 
In an age of statutes, legislative advocates influence the substantive 
content of almost every law.  Yet scholars know very little about the role that 
advocates play in shaping statutory law because the study of legislative 
advocacy has been left to political scientists, who focus on the political rather 
than the legal aspects of legislative lawmaking.  This Article responds to this 
gap in the literature by presenting an innovative, mixed methods approach 
to studying legislative advocacy that brings law back into the study of 
legislative advocacy and provides more accurate descriptions of how 
legislative advocates behave.  This legal approach to legislative advocacy 
improves on the existing political science literature by emphasizing the 
legislative process as a lawmaking enterprise and highlighting the 
importance of the substantive content of statutory laws to legislative 
advocates and their behavior.  The Article demonstrates the utility of this 
approach by presenting new empirical data on American Indian advocacy.  
My analysis produces two important insights about legislative advocates’ 
behavior overlooked in previous studies.  First, it reveals that advocates 
perceive legislative advocacy to be about modifying the substantive content 
of a proposed law.  Legislative advocates take the law seriously as they 
engage in nuanced and sophisticated strategies to interact with legislators 
and other political actors to craft statutory laws.  They advocate on a wide 
range of proposed laws, shift their positions strategically throughout the 
legislative process, and frequently seek to modify proposed laws.  Second, 
my account of Indian advocacy emphasizes that legislative advocacy involves 
legal as well as political work.  Indian advocates regularly used legal frames 
and arguments to educate and persuade legislators to shape the law in ways 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans spent $3.4 billion trying to influence legislative lawmaking 
through lobbying in 2019 alone.1  Legislative advocacy continues to rise, with 
 
 1. Erin Duffin, Total Lobbying Spending in the United States from 1998 to 2019, STATISTA 
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/257337/total-lobbying-spending-in-the-us/; Karl 
Evers-Hillstrom, Lobbying Spending Reaches $3.4 Billion in 2018, Highest in 8 Years, OPEN 
SECRETS (Jan. 25, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2019/01/lobbying-
spending-reaches-3-4-billion-in-18/. 
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lawyers frequently playing a role in the legislative process.2  Legislative 
advocates influence every major—and almost every minor—piece of federal 
legislation.  They often draft portions of the laws that Congress enacts.3  Yet, 
legal scholars have historically left the study of legislative advocacy to 
political scientists and focused primarily on judicial advocacy.4 
This Article argues that legal scholars need to reclaim the study of 
legislative advocacy.  It presents an innovative new approach to investigating 
advocate behavior and demonstrates how this new approach produces more 
accurate descriptions of legislative advocacy by examining American Indian 
legislative advocacy.  As Part II shows, the current division of labor leaves 
legal scholars relying on political scientists to understand the role advocates 
play in legislative lawmaking.  From a legal perspective, political scientists’ 
understanding of legislative advocacy often appears incomplete and 
underdeveloped.  Political scientists emphasize the role of professional 
lobbyists and downplay the importance of legislative lawyering in the 
legislative process.5  They have produced important studies documenting 
some of the political strategies, tactics, and arguments used by lobbyists.6  
But political scientists overlook many aspects of legislative advocacy 
 
 2. See BURDETT A. LOOMIS & WENDY J. SCHILLER, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS 38 (4th 
ed. 2004) (documenting a 300 percent increase in the number of registered lobbyists from 1981 to 
2001—from 6,000 registered lobbyists in 1981 to 20,000 in 2001); see also JEFFREY M. BERRY & 
CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 17–22 (5th ed. 2016) (documenting the increase 
in lobbying over time more generally); Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Congressional and Presidential 
Effects on the Demand for Lobbying, 64 POL. RSCH. Q. 3, 4 (2011) (documenting the same); Beth 
L. Leech et al., Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for 
Advocacy, 58 POL. RSCH. Q. 19, 20 (2005) (documenting the same).  Sociolegal studies confirm 
that lawyers often play a role in legislative advocacy.  See Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A 
Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 304 (1996); 
Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 
1242 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
2027, 2046–48 (2008). 
 3. Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 191, 
194 (2012). 
 4. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of 
Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2014). 
 5. A legislative lawyer is a lawyer who practices law in a political, advocacy context.  Chai R. 
Feldblum, The Art of Legislative Lawyering and the Six Circles Theory of Advocacy, 34 MCGEORGE 
L. REV. 785, 786 (2003).  In this Article, I use legislative advocacy to connote a wider range of 
behaviors and concerns than that of professional lobbyists hired to represent clients.  This broader 
term more accurately describes the behavior I observed in my study, in which many of the advocates 
were tribal leaders or leaders of tribal organizations rather than lobbyists.  
 6. For descriptions of lobbying activities, see, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. 
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 150 
(2009). 
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important to lawyers, legal scholars, and activists.7  Their studies often omit 
discussions of the nuanced positions that legislative advocates take as they 
draft legislative language and overlook how legislative advocates negotiate 
the process to shape the law.8  Legislative advocates frequently use legal 
frames and arguments to influence legislative lawmaking9 but political 
science studies often underemphasize these discursive aspects of the 
legislative process and overlook the often complicated ways that advocates 
interact with other political actors in legislative lawmaking.   
Lawyers, lawyer-lobbyists, legislative lawyers, and legal scholars have 
long recognized  the various roles that lawyers play in drafting legislation 
and using the law to influence legislators, but few studies have thoroughly 
investigated these behaviors.10  Recently, legal scholars have begun to 
provide more nuanced accounts of legislative advocacy, but they have yet to 
devise an approach to studying legislative advocacy across issues and 
contexts from a legal perspective that fully addresses the gaps left by the 
political science literature.11   
Legal scholars and advocates deserve more accurate descriptions of how 
advocates behave in the legislative process and influence legislative 
lawmaking.  Statutory law governs almost every aspect of modern life.12  In 
an age of statutes, lawyers cannot affect legal change without understanding 
the legislative process and the role of advocates within it.13  Developing more 
accurate descriptions of legislative advocates’ behavior is an important first 
step toward understanding how, when, and why advocates influence 
lawmaking.  Without accurate descriptions of what legislative advocates do, 
it is impossible to determine how, when, and why they influence legislators 
and other political actors.  Further, without more nuanced understandings of 
the legislative process and how it can be used to change the law, lawyers may 
overlook the legislative process as an alternative to judicial or administrative 
processes in their law reform efforts.14 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and 
Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 112–17 (2013). 
 10. Shobe, supra note 4 (2014) (discussing the few studies empirically discussing legislative 
drafting). 
 11. See supra Part II. 
 12. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 2015). 
 13. See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 785–86 (noting the need for better instruction in 
legislative lawmaking in law schools); Dakota S. Rudesill, Closing the Legislative Experience Gap: 
How a Legislative Law Clerk Program Will Benefit the Legal Profession and Congress, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 699, 699–700 (2010) (arguing for a legislative internship program to remedy the lack of 
legislative experience among U.S. lawyers). 
 14. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 708–09. 
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Relying on a political science literature that does not consider questions 
relevant to lawyers leads legal scholars, judges, and advocates to base their 
legal analyses on incorrect or inaccurate assumptions about how the 
legislative process and legislative advocacy works. Underdeveloped or 
incorrect theories about the legislative process and how advocates influence 
it undermines legal scholars’ and judges’ ability to formulate theories of 
statutory interpretation, prescriptive recommendations for how the courts and 
Congress can interact, and reforms to electoral, lobbying, and other laws.15  
In short, good prescription depends on good description. 
Part III responds to this need for more accurate information.  It seeks to 
improve on existing understandings of legislative advocacy by introducing 
an innovative, mixed-methods approach to studying legislative advocacy 
from a legal perspective.  Unlike recent political science approaches, my 
approach emphasizes that legislative advocacy occurs within an interactive, 
discursive process that aims to make laws.  Building on my previous work, I 
combine theoretical and methodological insights from political science and 
legal literatures in devising my approach.16  I take useful insights from the 
political science literature on advocate strategies, positions, and tactics and 
integrate them with legal scholars’ conceptualization of the legislative 
process as an interactive and discursive lawmaking enterprise.  Borrowing 
from sociolegal studies of judicial advocacy,17 I emphasize how legislative 
advocates employ the law—legal arguments, frameworks, and practices—in 
the legislative process.  By examining the various positions advocates take 
and the arguments they make throughout the legislative process, my approach 
facilitates an in-depth exploration of how advocates negotiate legislative 
lawmaking and interact with legislators to craft the law through this dynamic 
process. 
The Article then demonstrates how my innovative approach provides a 
more accurate description of advocate behavior by presenting new, empirical 
data on American Indian advocacy.  Part IV explains how I operationalized 
my approach to conduct a study of American Indian advocacy.  The study of 
Indian advocacy facilitates a thorough investigation of legislative advocate 
behavior.  Most organized interests focus on a few issues,18 but Indian 
 
 15. Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–12 (discussing how inaccurate theories about legislatures harm 
statutory interpretation). 
 16. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Making Strategic Choices: How and Why Indian Groups Advocated 
for Federal Recognition from 1977 to 2012, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 930, 932 (2017); Kirsten Matoy 
Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 23, 52–55 (2019). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner & Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: 
Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics, 63 J. POLITICS 1191 (2001); JACK L. 
WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA (1991); William P. Browne, Organized 
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advocates have a much broader agenda.  They use myriad advocacy strategies 
to advocate on subject matters of concern to the general public 
(e.g., education, healthcare) as well as their interests as business owners 
(e.g., employment, taxation, gaming) and governments (e.g., environmental 
regulation, economic development, preservation of culture and language, 
housing).19  Due to its breadth, Indian advocacy covers most of the issues 
pursued by various interests across the United States.  Thus, Indian advocacy 
can be treated like a microcosm for better understanding legislative advocacy 
within the United States more generally.20   
Part V reveals how legislative advocates negotiate the legislative 
process and interact with legislators and other political actors to craft legal 
texts.  It shows that advocates perceive legislative advocacy to be about 
modifying the substantive content of a proposed law.  Contrary to recent 
political science studies, which have emphasized legislative advocates as 
acting as either proponents or opponents to a proposed law,21 my data 
demonstrate that advocates often have a third choice: to engage in the 
lawmaking process to shape laws that better reflect their interests.  Modifiers 
do not simply engage in preference aggregation like many interest group 
theories suggest advocates do.22  Rather, they advocate to change the 
substance of the proposed law and focus on shaping the text.   
Modifiers play an impressive role in the legislative process.  Indian 
advocates sought to modify 53% of the bills studied with over a quarter, 28%, 
of all Indian advocates engaged in modification strategies.23  They sought to 
shape legislative texts across a wide range of subject matters on general, 
national policies (e.g., healthcare, education, and nuclear waste storage), tribe 
specific issues (e.g., land claims and water rights settlements), and federal 
Indian policy.  These findings significantly broaden and enrich many political 
science studies, which have focused more narrowly on major players 
advocating on significant legislation.  My work presents a wider view of 
legislative advocacy, showing that some legislative advocates do not limit 
their advocacy to major bills but attempt to shape a wide range of legislation 
 
Interests and their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in the Policy Domain, 52 J. POLITICS 477 
(1990). 
 19. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, 2018 BYU L. REV. 
1159, 1173–74 (2018). 
 20. DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM xxviii (3d ed. 2011).   
 21. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 22. For a discussion of interest group theories, see generally KENNETH GODWIN ET AL., 
LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING: THE PUBLIC PURSUIT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS (2013). 
 23. See infra Part V. 
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in sophisticated and nuanced ways.24  For example, American Indians have 
sought to alter the content of bills affecting only one or a few tribes, to protect 
or improve programs in general legislation, and to renegotiate federal Indian 
policy.25 
Taking modifiers into account uncovers the full range of strategies used, 
positions taken, tactics employed, and arguments made by legislative 
advocates.  Legislative advocates employ a much broader range of positions 
in trying to negotiate the legislative process than the binary 
proponent/opponent model relied on in some recent political science studies.  
Indian advocates utilized at least six different positions in their advocacy.  
Based on these findings, I devise a more accurate typology of the different 
positions taken by advocates in the legislative process.  
Exploring this range of positions shows how advocates use the 
legislative process to negotiate with other political actors to craft the law.  
Contrary to recent political science studies, which describe legislative 
advocates as having fixed positions, my data demonstrate how Indian 
modifiers perceived their positions as relational and changeable throughout 
the legislative process.  Indian advocates often emphasized the drawbacks to 
a bill as a way to negotiate for provisions within the legislation that more 
accurately responded to their needs. 
The various and changing positions taken by Indian advocates exposes 
an important reality overlooked in most of the recent political science 
literature: “legislative work is legal work.”26  Legislative advocates care 
about legal texts and frequently use legal frames and arguments to shape 
statutory law.  American Indian proponents, opponents, and modifiers all 
employed the law in their legislative advocacy to influence lawmakers.  
While some utilized legal frames central to federal Indian law, like self-
determination and the trust responsibility, others made cogent arguments 
about how specific bills would conflict with or undermine existing laws.  My 
research demonstrates how advocates take the law and legal arguments 
seriously as a part of legislative advocacy. 
Part VI considers the significant implications of a legal approach to 
studying legislative advocacy for key constituencies of American democracy.  
For scholars of advocacy groups, my research demonstrates an innovative 
methodology for studying legislative advocacy that produces richer accounts 
of advocate behavior and its influence on lawmaking.  For Indian nations and 
advocacy groups more generally, the application of my approach 
 
 24. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (studying the most active lobbying organizations 
on a random sample of issues that generated more lobbying activity). 
 25. See infra Part V. 
 26. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 700. 
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demonstrates how advocacy can be used broadly and in nuanced and 
sophisticated ways to shape statutory law.  This insight suggests that multiple 
possibilities and pathways may exist for advocates to influence the creation 
and development of the law. 
II. UNDERSTANDING ADVOCATE BEHAVIOR IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
In this Part, I review the many important insights into the behavior of 
legislative advocates produced by political scientists and explain how that 
literature leaves unanswered important questions about how legislative 
advocates craft statutes as legal texts.   
Legal scholars have historically left the study of legislative advocacy to 
political scientists.27  Political scientists ask questions about the political 
aspects of legislative advocacy and seek to develop models that predict 
political behaviors and outcomes.28  Their focus does not mirror that of 
lawyers and legal scholars, who desire information on how to shape the law.29  
Rather, political scientists seek to understand how interest groups influence 
political outcomes; as a result, they have devoted considerable attention to 
studying lobbying.  
Political scientists have identified many of the basic strategies, 
arguments, and tactics used by legislative advocates to achieve their goals.  
They describe legislative advocates as sophisticated, strategic actors.30  
Legislative advocates develop nuanced strategies by adapting to various 
opportunities and constraints31 and may use the legislative process to pursue 
goals other than policy enactment or failure.32  
In terms of basic strategies, political scientists describe legislative 
advocates as either defending the status quo or trying to change it.33  
 
 27. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–09.  
 28. See, e.g., GODWIN ET AL., supra note 22.  
 29. Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 521, 522 (1997). 
 30. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 126 (describing lobbyists as strategic 
actors responding to various constraints).   
 31. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 78.   
 32. Some interest group scholars have observed that goals other than policy change may drive 
lobbying behavior.  GODWIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 203–05; BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 
6, at 195–98; David Lowery, Why Do Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context 
Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29, 29–30 (2007).  These scholars suggest lobbyists have additional 
motivations for lobbying, including leveraging institutional relationships.  GODWIN ET AL., supra 
note 22; Frederick J. Boehmke, Sean Gailmard, & John Wiggins Patty, Business as Usual: Interest 
Group Access and Representation Across Policy-Making Venues, 33 J. PUB. POL’Y 3, 21 (2013) 
(ensuring organizational survival); LOWERY, supra (building support for the issue, educating the 
public, and developing credibility among congressional staffers).   
 33. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 61. 
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Advocates make arguments based on their position on a bill.34  Political 
scientists have identified the policy-based arguments made by advocates to 
include the ease of implementation or feasibility, costs, ability of the bill to 
achieve specific goals, and other consequences of enacting the bill.35  
Common tactics used by lobbyists include engaging in direct contact with 
members of Congress and their staffs, testifying at hearings, drafting 
legislative language, mobilizing grassroots advocacy, and conducting public 
education campaigns.36   
Most political scientists agree that advocates influence the legislative 
process by providing credible information to legislators and staffers about a 
proposed law.37  Advocates strategically provide information to change or 
reinforce legislators’ beliefs about legislative outcomes, the operational 
effects of policies, and the electoral ramifications of their actions.38  But few 
have investigated how these exchanges of information work on the ground.39  
Some political scientists started to develop models that saw legislators and 
advocates engaged in negotiation and persuasion,40 but recent studies have 
shifted away from the discursive aspects of legislative lawmaking. 
Recent political science studies have leveraged the increased 
availability of data in the digital age to examine the efforts of major 
participants from multiple organized interests on various issues or legislative 
proposals.41  These studies often produce important insights into the behavior 
of legislative advocates, but their findings often overlook the more nuanced 
strategies, tactics, and arguments advocates use.  For example, some recent 
studies have described legislative advocacy strategies as binary.  Legislative 
advocates act as either proponents or opponents.42  Proponents, sometimes 
 
 34. Id. at 133–43. 
 35. Id. at 145 (listing different kinds of policy arguments made by lobbyists). 
 36. Id. at 150.  For descriptions of lobbying activities, see, e.g., SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra 
note 6, at 295–96. 
 37. See, e.g., GODWIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5; JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND 
CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 75–97 (1996); BAUMGARTNER ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 65. 
 38. WRIGHT, supra note 37, at 75 (1996).   
 39. PAUL BURSTEIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, ADVOCACY, AND POLICY IN CONGRESS: 
WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS AND WHAT IT GETS 100 (2014) (“Very little is known about whether 
individuals and organizations provide elected officials with the information they want or if the 
information affects policy.”). 
 40. Richard A. Smith, Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 89, 
98–104 (1995). 
 41. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 42. Id.; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115.  Not all interest group scholars frame their studies in 
this binary manner.  See, e.g., CHRISTINE MAHONEY, BRUSSELS VERSUS THE BELTWAY: 
ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 33 (2008) (noting that advocates 
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called status quo challengers, seek to change law and policy.43  Opponents, 
or status quo defenders, are the adversaries of proponents.  They seek to 
defend the status quo by preventing changes to law and policy.  Recent 
studies report that the typical structure of a policy conflict has one proactive 
side, the status quo challengers, and one opposition side, the status quo 
defenders.44  
These studies present important findings about the different tactics and 
arguments used by status quo challengers and defenders but, in their efforts 
to produce generalizable and parsimonious explanations, they overlook the 
role of the law in these arguments and tactics.  Few details are provided about 
differences in tactics and arguments used by advocates on the same side.  The 
assumption seems to be that since the goal is the same––enactment or defeat 
of the proposed law—advocates on the same side largely agree among 
themselves about tactics, arguments, and positions.  This simple model 
overlooks the complexity of the interactions and negotiations that occur 
within the legislative process and the role that legislative advocates play in 
them.  The focus on proponents and opponents obscures the more 
complicated and nuanced positions that advocates may take in the legislative 
process.  Further, the rhetoric of proponents and opponents presupposes that 
one side will win and the other will lose and perpetuates the idea that 
legislative lawmaking is an all or nothing game.  Laws, however, frequently 
result from negotiations and provide benefits to more than one group.45  
Advocacy groups may consider short term successes and incremental impacts 
on the details of a proposed law as important wins.  As earlier political 
science studies emphasized, “the ability to have an impact on the details of a 
policy is not in the least a trivial form of influence.”46  Recent political 
science studies, however, have overlooked this important fact.  By 
 
take different positions, including promoting, modifying, or blocking a proposal); see SCHLOZMAN 
& TIERNEY, supra note 6. 
 43. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
 44. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 61. 
 45. Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 1, 32–33 (1994) (“But what interest group theories of legislation suppose is the norm––a 
victorious interest group capturing the statute . . . ––is more likely the exception, rather than the 
rule.  One searches in vain for many instances in which we can confidently describe a regulatory 
statute as the creation of a particular interest group.  Much more common are those statutes that 
represent a combination of interest group pressures filtered through legislative processes and 
ameliorated through the struggle within the legislature and with legislators and their constituents, 
all of which results in a statute with multiple winners and losers.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 46. SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 6, at 311 (suggesting that “[o]n the contrary, one of 
the axioms of policy analysis is that to know what a piece of legislation actually does, it is important 
to look beyond its broad purposes to the particulars; it is the details that specify such critical matters 
as when the measure is to take effect, whom it covers, how much is to be spent, and who has what 
authority to implement it.”). 
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oversimplifying wins and losses as policy enactment or failure, they may 
obscure the nuanced relationships that may develop between advocates and 
legislators as they negotiate the substantive content of laws. 
Recent political science studies provide a big picture view of legislative 
advocacy, but in doing so, they often overlook how advocates use the law to 
negotiate the legislative process.  By focusing on how advocates build 
coalitions and aggregate preferences, they underemphasize the fact that 
legislative advocacy produces substantive legal texts.  As lawyers, lawyer-
lobbyists, and legal scholars have noted, legislative advocacy includes 
making constitutional, statutory, and other legal arguments, drafting statutory 
language and amendments to statutory language, and conducting legal 
research to support arguments for or against proposed laws.47  Recent 
political science studies emphasize that legislative advocacy is normative in 
that advocates take positions for or against proposed laws, but they limit their 
discussion of the arguments used by advocates to policy arguments and 
overlook how advocates use arguments to construct meanings and laws.48  
Legislative advocates may rely on legal arguments and frameworks to 
construct these meanings and shape the law, but political scientists have yet 
to examine this aspect of legislative advocate behavior. 
Political scientists have made considerable contributions to 
understanding the behavior of legislative advocates, but they understate the 
legal nature of the legislative process and fall short of providing lawyers, 
lobbyists, and legal scholars with nuanced and accurate descriptions of how 
legislative lawmaking actually works.49  As a result, legal scholars have 
lamented that lawyers, legal scholars, and judges lack in-depth knowledge 
about the legislative process and the role that advocates play in it.50  
 
 47. ALAN K. CHEN & SCOTT L. CUMMINGS, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 259 (2013). 
 48. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 145. 
 49. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–09; Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: 
Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 1119, 1122, 1125 (2011). 
 50. See, e.g., Shobe, supra note 4, at 808–12 (discussing how inaccurate theories about 
legislatures harm statutory interpretation); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2073 (2006) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
(2006)) (noting that younger scholars do not have a deep grounding in legislative processes); 
Nourse, supra note 49, at 1125 (arguing that three dominant theories of statutory interpretation rely 
on misguided views of the legislative process); Rudesill, supra note 13, at 700–01 (lamenting the 
lack of legislative work experience among lawyers and noting what new lawyers need to learn about 
the legislative process).  Federal judges have also lamented the lack of knowledge that federal judges 
in general have about the legislative process.  See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing 
Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 183 (1986); James L. Buckley, Introduction of Discussion Subject 
and Panelists, in Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia 
Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 313 (1989); Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist Number 86: On Relations 
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Despite the gaps in the political science literature, legal scholars have 
historically paid less attention to the study of legislative advocacy.51  Some 
legal scholars have developed case studies of legislative advocacy leading to 
the enactment of important state or federal laws.52  These legislative histories 
tend to characterize the legislative process as interactive and deliberative.53  
They highlight the complicated nature of the process, including how it 
proceeds in stages.54  Each stage provides some opportunities, albeit different 
ones, for legislative advocacy.55  Legislative advocates engage in 
negotiations with other stakeholders and legislators throughout the process.56  
Advocates and political actors have to make calculated decisions about what 
can be achieved in the process now and what has to be pursued over the long 
 
Between the Judiciary and Congress, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL 
COMITY 21, 22 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988). 
 51. Legal scholars have focused more on normative discussions of statutory law and have 
generated descriptions, critiques, and evaluations of existing laws as well as proscriptive arguments 
about what the law should be.  Recently, a few scholars have advocated for law schools to take 
legislative advocacy more seriously.  See, e.g., Feldblum, supra note 5, at 785–87; Rudesill, supra 
note 13, at 699.  Legal scholars have also started to investigate the legislative drafting process and 
how it relates to statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 905 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2014); Victoria F. 
Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
 52. Brayden G. King et al., Winning Woman Suffrage One Step at a Time: Social Movements 
and the Logic of the Legislative Process, 83 SOC. FORCES 1211, 1214 (2005); Chai R. Feldblum & 
Robin Appleberry, Legislatures, Agencies, Courts, and Advocates: How Laws Are Made, 
Interpreted, and Modified, in THE WORK AND FAMILY HANDBOOK: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES, METHODS, AND APPROACHES 627, 633–35 (Marcie Pitt-Catsouphes et al. eds., 
2006). 
 53. See, e.g., Feldblum & Appleberry, supra note 52, at 627–50; Bethany R. Berger, United 
States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5, 11–13 (2004); Neta Ziv, Cause 
Lawyers, Clients, and the State: Congress as a Forum for Cause Lawyering during the Enactment 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 
211, 212 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001). 
 54. Textbook descriptions of the legislative process describe a bill as proceeding through 
several stages on the way to enactment.  Simplified versions of the legislative process detail these 
stages as: drafting of the bill, introduction of the bill by a member of Congress in the House, referral 
to a House committee, committee consideration and action, scheduling floor action in the House, 
floor action in the House, referral to the Senate, referral to a standing committee, committee 
consideration and action, referral to conference committee, and presentment to the President. 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 23–34 (2d ed. 
2006).  See also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 12.  
 55. King et al., supra note 52, at 1214; Feldblum & Appleberry, supra note 52, at 633–35. 
 56. Feldblum & Appleberry, supra note 52, at 633–35. 
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term.57  They may change their preferences based on these political realities.58  
These studies highlight the fluidity of the legislative process and how that 
fluidity encourages advocates to act relationally and reflexively to maximize 
their influence over the legislative text.  These studies provide important 
insights into the legislative process and how advocates engage with 
legislators in it, but most of them either focus on the development of one bill 
or a few related bills or describe the activities of a single advocacy group.59  
They do not attempt to describe legislative advocate behavior across a range 
of bills or advocacy groups and the generalizability of their findings remains 
unknown. 
Legal scholars have started to integrate investigations of legislative 
advocacy into their studies of advocacy more generally.60  These scholars 
frequently borrow from and situate their examinations of legislative 
advocacy within sociolegal studies on judicial advocacy.61  Unlike political 
scientists, sociolegal scholars study how advocates use the rhetorical 
 
 57. Berger, supra note 53, at 12 (explaining that tribal advocates and their legislative champions 
initially settled for a Duro Fix with a sunset provision because it was better than no Duro Fix at all 
and they knew they would continue to advocate for a permanent one). 
 58. Some legal scholars view the legislative process as relational and reflexive.  Ziv, supra note 
53, at 212.  Political actors may enter the legislative process with predetermined interests, but those 
interests change as the legislative initiative proceeds, “through the constant interaction with other 
codeliberators who partake in this process.”  Id.  An evolving process of dialogues, negotiations, 
and deliberations among advocacy groups, staffers, and members of Congress translates the various 
interests held by each into law.  Id. at 213 (“The ‘interest’—an abstract idea that leads groups to 
initiate a political move—breaks down into a series of dialogues, negotiations, and deliberations.  
Each one proceeds through the legislative process through the formation of diverse alliances and 
relations—within the social group acting for legislative reform, between the group and its 
representatives, between those representatives and key players in the state apparatus, and vice 
versa.”). 
 59. Dinner, supra note 9, at 80; Berger, supra note 53, at 12. 
 60. See, e.g., Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 932; Scott L. Cummings & 
Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010); Michael 
McCann & William Haltom, Alta Shrugged: Why Personal Injury Lawyers Are Not Public 
Defenders of Their Own Causes, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND 
AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE 433–38 (Austin Sarat ed., 2005); HOLLY J. MCCAMMON, THE U.S. 
WOMEN’S JURY MOVEMENTS AND STRATEGIC ADAPTATION: A MORE JUST VERDICT 12 (2012); 
Stephen L. Wasby, Litigation and Lobbying as Complementary Strategies for Civil Rights, in 
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). 
 61. See generally MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW 
SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS (2009); Wasby, supra note 60; Cummings & 
NeJaime, supra note 60, at 1247–56.  Sociolegal studies investigate how and why groups use the 
law as a political and strategic resource to challenge the status quo, change institutional rules, and 
redistribute power.  See generally STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1975); MCCANN, supra note 61; JOEL F. HANDLER, 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
(1978); Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from Theory 
and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 603, 605 (2009). 
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resources of the law—legal arguments, frameworks, and practices—to argue 
for social change.62  But most sociolegal studies continue to emphasize 
litigation strategies rather than legislative advocacy.  A few studies have 
sought to determine whether, when, and how legislative advocates employ 
the law in legislative contexts.63  But legal scholars have yet to develop a 
legal approach to studying legislative advocacy across issues and contexts 
that fills the gaps left by political science studies.  
Legal scholars, lawyers, and advocates need more accurate descriptions 
of legislative advocacy to improve their ability to change the law through the 
legislative process64 and to develop better theories of statutory interpretation 
and separation of powers.65  Despite the juricentrism in most law schools, 
litigation is not the only way to resolve legal problems.66  The legislative 
process often provides a viable alternative but lawyers cannot effectively use 
it to help their clients if they either do not see it as another way to change the 
law or do not know how to use it.67  Similarly, a lack of knowledge of the 
legislative process and how advocates influence it undermines legal scholars’ 
abilities to craft theories about how Congress should relate to courts and 
agencies.68  The next Part proposes a legal approach to studying legislative 
advocacy that will provide legal scholars and lawyers with more nuanced 
descriptions of the legislative process as a lawmaking enterprise. 
III. EMPIRICALLY INVESTIGATING LEGISLATIVE ADVOCATE BEHAVIOR: A 
LEGAL APPROACH 
This Part combines insights from the political science and legal 
literatures to devise an innovative, mixed methods approach to studying the 
behavior of legislative advocates.  This approach responds to the political 
science literature’s failure to view legislative advocacy as legal work.  It 
treats advocates as sophisticated actors engaged in nuanced behaviors to 
shape the law and emphasizes the interactive aspects of the legislative 
process. 
 
 62. See generally HANDLER, supra note 61; MCCANN, supra note 61; GERALD ROSENBERG, 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S 
ALLURE, supra note 61; HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE 
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996); Reva Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution 
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 303–04 (2001). 
 63. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 932. 
 64. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 709.   
 65. Nourse, supra note 49, at 1122–36. 
 66. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 709; CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 47, at 201–02. 
 67. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 709–10; Feldblum, supra note 5, at 785–86. 
 68. Nourse, supra note 49, at 1122. 
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In devising this new approach, I start from the premise, shared by many 
political scientists and legal scholars, that the legislative process is complex 
and interactive.69  I emphasize that the purpose of this complicated process is 
to make laws.   
Like other legal scholars, I conceptualize advocacy as a prescriptive 
enterprise, in which advocates interpret and critique existing laws and 
policies and then propose recommendations to legal decisionmakers.70  In 
short, advocates are strategic actors seeking prescriptive goals within an 
interactive and discursive legislative process.   
I take useful insights from the political science literature on advocate 
strategies, positions, and tactics and integrate them with this 
conceptualization of the legislative process as an interactive and discursive 
lawmaking enterprise.  By highlighting the interactive and discursive nature 
of the legislative process, my approach facilitates an in-depth exploration of 
how advocates use different strategies, positions, and tactics to negotiate and 
interact with legislators to craft different kinds of compromises across a range 
of issues on proposed legislation.  Once a wider range of strategies, positions, 
and tactics is identified, I examine how legislative advocates employ the 
law—legal arguments, frameworks, and practices—in the legislative process.  
Borrowing from sociolegal scholars studying judicial advocacy, my approach 
investigates how legislative advocates use the law.71  Like sociolegal 
scholars, I emphasize the role of law in advocacy strategies, perceiving the 
law to be a resource that may be employed in legal and political struggles72 
and as “constantly constructed and reconstructed through human 
interaction.”73  My approach thus investigates how legislative advocates use 
the law to construct meanings and provides a better understanding of the 
modes of discourse that advocates employ in making arguments. 
My approach improves upon existing approaches in several ways.  First, 
by integrating insights from the political science and legal literatures, my 
approach provides a more accurate description of advocate behavior.  
Political scientists have explored the strategies and positions taken by 
legislative advocates, but they tend to oversimplify them by emphasizing 
their binary nature.74  My approach moves beyond this binary view by 
 
 69. Ziv, supra note 53, at 212. 
 70. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 29, at 522. 
 71. See generally HANDLER, supra note 61; MCCANN, supra note 61; SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S 
ALLURE, supra note 61; SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS, supra note 62. 
 72. HANDLER, supra note 61; MCCANN, supra note 61; SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS 
supra note 62. 
 73. Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, Making Way: Legal Mobilization, Organizational 
Response, and Wheelchair Access, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 167, 168 (2012). 
 74. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
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contextualizing legislative advocacy as part of a fluid, relational, and 
interactive process for making the law.  Adopting this view of the legislative 
process suggests that advocate strategies and positions may be more nuanced 
and flexible than recent political science studies have indicated.  Legislative 
advocates, even ones working together towards either enactment or non-
enactment of a proposed law, may vary in terms of positions, tactics, and 
arguments.  While they may agree on a desired, final outcome, they may 
disagree on how to get there or what changes they want made to the proposed 
law first.  Further, advocates constantly engage with one another, legislators, 
legislative staffers, and other political actors throughout the legislative 
process.  Their strategies and positions may change over time as a result of 
these interactions.  Contextualizing legislative advocacy as part of an 
interactive process facilitates investigation into variation among advocates in 
their strategies, positions, arguments, and tactics over time and provides a 
more accurate description of legislative advocate behavior. 
Second, my approach allows for deeper investigations into the 
legislative process as a series of negotiations about the content of the law.  
My approach expands on earlier political science studies that sought to 
integrate “the study of law and legal reasoning with more analytic and 
explanatory approaches to the study of” legislative politics.75  By focusing on 
how legislative advocates build coalitions and aggregate preferences in the 
legislative process, recent political science studies have understated 
advocates’ attempts to influence the content of the law.  As legal scholars 
have long emphasized, legislative advocates take positions and make 
arguments to negotiate statutory language.76  Legislative advocates 
frequently do this through texts (for example, committee hearings, reports, 
and draft bills), but political scientists rarely analyze these texts.  Analyzing 
these texts allows for examination of how legislators and advocates interact 
and negotiate lawmaking as an enterprise in meaning making and text 
creation.   
Third, my approach facilitates an in-depth analysis of how legislative 
advocates use the law to argue for and against specific proposed bills.  
Sociolegal scholars have long documented how advocates employ legal 
frames and arguments in judicial processes,77 but few have considered the 
role that law plays in legislative advocacy.  Building upon my previous 
work,78 my approach extends this research into the legislative arena by 
 
 75. John Ferejohn, Law, Legislation, and Positive Political Theory, in MODERN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: OLD TOPICS, NEW DIRECTIONS 192 (Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek, eds., 1995). 
 76. CHEN & CUMMINGS, supra note 47, at 259. 
 77. See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE, supra note 61; Siegel, supra note 62, at 303. 
 78. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 931. 
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adding interpretive and textual analysis to an examination of targeted 
advocacy on specific proposed laws.79  A more in-depth analysis of texts 
facilitates the identification and exploration of the legal frames and 
arguments used by legislative advocates.  My approach brings law back into 
the study of legislative advocacy and allows for investigation into how, when, 
and why legislative advocates utilize the law. 
Finally, my approach models a way for scholars to devise more complex 
understandings of advocate behavior in legislative lawmaking.  Like recent 
political science studies that examine advocacy across a range of issues, it 
allows for the development of insights that are applicable across a number of 
contexts and can be used to formulate some generalizable insights about how 
legislative advocates behave.80  My approach, however, improves upon these 
studies by incorporating interpretative and textual analyses that provide more 
nuanced understandings of how advocates use the law to negotiate with 
legislators and other political actors to craft laws.  As a result, my approach 
starts to answer questions that recent political science studies have 
overlooked yet are important to lawyers, advocates, and legal scholars.   
IV. STUDYING AMERICAN INDIAN LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY  
This Part describes how I operationalized my approach and used it to 
conduct a study of legislative advocacy by American Indians over time.  It 
explains the research design, case selection, data collection, and limitations 
to the study.  
A. Research Design 
Legislative advocacy by American Indians is the object of my study for 
a variety of reasons.  American Indians, and especially Indian nations, have 
a long and rich history of engaging with the United States government.81  
Indian nations have employed a variety of advocacy strategies over the past 
five centuries from declaring war on the United States to sending delegations 
 
 79. Previous scholars pioneered a methodology for examination of targeted advocacy on 
proposed laws.  BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 102–03.   
 80. See, e.g., BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115; BAUMGARTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7.  
 81. See generally FREDRICK E. HOXIE, THIS INDIAN COUNTRY: AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISTS 
AND THE PLACE THEY MADE (2013); EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS/WHITE JUSTICE: THE 
SIOUX NATION VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT (1991) (documenting over two 
decades of Sioux advocacy for a congressional act authorizing the bringing of the Black Hills claim 
in federal court); W. DALE MASON, INDIAN GAMING: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 40 (2000); see also Daniel Carpenter, On the Emergence of the Administrative Petition: 
Innovations in Nineteenth-Century Indigenous North America, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE 
INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 349 (Nicholas R. Parrillo 
ed., 2017). 
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to Congress and the White House to occupying the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs.82  Indian nations advocate on a wide range of issues from land and 
natural resources to health care and education to language and culture.  
Scholars have increasingly studied this advocacy and have produced studies 
on individual Indians as voters in mainstream elections,83 Indian protest 
movements after World War II,84 campaign contributions made by Indian 
nations involved in gaming enterprises,85 and Indian engagement in state and 
local politics.86   
This study builds on the few existing studies on American Indian 
legislative advocacy.87  Early studies on the relationship between Congress 
and American Indians found that Indian-related legislation falls into three 
categories: (1) pan-tribal legislation, which has an overriding purpose of 
developing federal Indian policy by addressing an issue faced by all Indian 
nations or citizens of Indian nations; (2) tribe specific legislation, which does 
not seek to establish general federal Indian law or policy but addresses a 
specific issue for one or a few but not all tribes; and (3) general legislation, 
which has a main substantive focus other than Indians (such as health, 
education, employment, etc.) but specifically mentions Indians or Indian 
tribes.88  Indian advocates have supported legislation across these three 
categories, suggesting that Indian advocates do not just target their advocacy 
 
 82. Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 137, 138–47 (2006); 
Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 16, at 29–35. 
 83. See, e.g., DANIEL MCCOOL, ET AL., NATIVE VOTE: AMERICAN INDIANS, THE VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT, AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2007); LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND 
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS (2011). 
 84. See generally DANIEL M. COBB, NATIVE ACTIVISM IN COLD WAR AMERICA: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2008); PAUL CHAAT SMITH & ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, LIKE A 
HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED KNEE (1996); JOANE 
NAGEL, AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF IDENTITY 
AND CULTURE (1996). 
 85. See, e.g., Fredrick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Indian Nations as Interest Groups: 
Tribal Motivations for Contributions to U.S. Senators, 65 POL. RSCH. Q. 179, 179–81 (2012); Jeff 
J. Corntassel & Richard C. Witmer, II, American Indian Tribal Government Support of Office-
Seekers: Findings from the 1994 Election, 34 SOC. SCI. J. 511, 514–22 (1997). 
 86. See, e.g., Corntassel & Witmer, supra note 85; LAURA E. EVANS, POWER FROM 
POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
(2011); KENNETH N. HANSEN & TRACY A. SKOPEK, THE NEW POLITICS OF INDIAN GAMING: THE 
RISE OF RESERVATION INTEREST GROUPS (2015); W. DALE MASON, supra note 81; Fredrick J. 
Boehmke & Richard Witmer, State Lobbying Registrations by Native American Tribes, 2015 POL., 
GROUPS & IDENTITIES 2 (2015); Raymond Foxworth, et al., Incorporating Native American History 
into the Curriculum, 96 SOC. SCI. QUARTERLY 955 (2015). 
 87. Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 938; Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy 
for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1174–1220; Richard Witmer & Frederick J. Boehmke, 
American Indian Political Incorporation in the Post-Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Era, 44 SOC. 
SCI. J. 127, 129 (2007). 
 88. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 10–11 (1987).  
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towards bills creating federal Indian policy but also advocate on a broad 
range of bills and subject matters.89  The wide range of subject matters and 
kinds of legislation that Indian nations and organizations advocate on serves 
as a microcosm for understanding American politics more generally and 
facilitates a thorough investigation of advocate behavior in a legislative 
setting.  Moreover, while this study emphasizes Indian advocacy, my data 
include non-Indian witnesses, many of whom act similarly to Indian 
advocates.90  This suggests that my findings may extend beyond Indian 
advocates to legislative advocates more generally. 
Existing studies on American Indian legislative advocacy have focused 
on Indian advocates as proponents of legal change.91  In my own previous 
research, I have distinguished between offensive strategies—used by 
proponents to support a legal change—and defensive strategies—used by 
opponents against a legal change—and documented that American Indians 
employ both kinds.92  But neither my work, nor any other study that I am 
aware of, broadly explores the behavior of Indian nations and organizations 
in their legislative advocacy.  
This study examines American Indian advocacy on Indian-related bills 
starting at the committee hearing stage of the legislative process and with a 
particular focus on committee hearing testimony.  I chose committee 
testimony for several reasons.  First, scholars have found that legislative 
advocates have more influence in the earlier stages of the legislative 
process.93  Committee hearings are early in the legislative process and they 
provide advocates with an opportunity to engage in targeted advocacy on 
specific proposed laws.94  Many legislative advocates testify at hearings 
because they deem it an important activity, and they widely use testimony to 
access and influence lawmakers.95  Second, advocacy groups employ 
 
 89. Most organized interests advocate on one or a few issues.  See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner 
& Beth L. Leech, Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement 
in National Politics, 63 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1191 (2001); JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING 
INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA (1991); William P. Browne, Organized Interests and their Issue 
Niches: A Search for Pluralism in the Policy Domain, 52 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 477 (1990).  In 
contrast, American Indians testify on a wide range of bills and subject matters.  See infra Part IV. 
 90. See, e.g., Hearings before the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights on H.R. 
3112, An Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Part I, 97th Cong. (May 27-28, 1981 and 
June 3, 1981) (demonstrating that non-Indian advocates take positions and make arguments similar 
to the ones identified used by Indian advocates in this study). 
 91. Berger, supra note 53, at 12; Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra note 16, at 938; 
Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1174–20.   
 92. Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1174. 
 93. King, et al., supra note 52, at 1214. 
 94. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 104.  As a result, “individuals and organizations invited to 
testify at congressional hearings may legitimately feel that their testimony will have an impact.”  Id. 
 95. SCHLOTZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 6, at 295. 
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hearings to gain access to lawmakers, to present carefully reasoned 
arguments and technical information, and to shape the legislative record in 
ways that may help them later in legislative, judicial, and administrative 
processes.96  Hearings provide advocacy groups with a public forum in which 
to make their arguments and sometimes increase publicity about proposed 
legislation.97  Third, committee hearings present an opportunity for targeted 
advocacy on a specific legislative proposal and allow for the linking of 
advocacy to a particular legislative proposal.98  By linking advocacy to a 
specific legislative proposal, the hearing data allow for examination of the 
impact of that advocacy on the legislative outcome (enactment or non-
enactment) of the legislative proposal.  Moreover, the textual nature of 
hearings facilitates the tracking and comparison of legislative arguments and 
texts over time, which reveal the extent to which legislators adopt language 
proposed by advocates. 
I used a mixed methods approach to investigate how and why American 
Indians advocated to influence legislative lawmaking.  Borrowing from the 
political science literature, I use quantitative data to provide a big picture 
view of advocate behavior.  Qualitative analysis supplements and enriches 
the quantitative data.  It ensures that the big picture view does not obscure 
important details about how advocates behave in legislative settings.  This 
mixed methods approach navigates a middle ground between non-
generalizable case studies and political science studies that produce 
generalizable insights but sacrifice nuance.   
B. Methodology 
I used quantitative methods to identify, describe, and compare the 
advocacy strategies that Indian nations and organizations used as witnesses 
testifying at committee hearings on specific proposed laws during two 
congressional sessions.  Consistent with previous studies,99 I expected to find 
that Indian advocates more frequently testified in favor of bills than against 
them.100  I investigated this expectation by coding the witnesses testifying for 
and against each bill in the dataset and then looking at the frequencies of 
proponents and opponents across all Indian-related bills.   
I accessed primary data on advocacy by American Indians from several 
sources, including a database of Indian-related bills,101 publicly available and 
 
 96. Id. at 296. 
 97. Id.  
 98. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 104. 
 99. BAUMGARTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
 100. BAUMGARTER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
 101. Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 78, 95 (2015).  
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archival materials on legislation introduced in Congress,102 and interviews 
with advocates for American Indian nations and organizations.  I examined a 
sample of congressional hearings held on Indian-related bills during two 
congressional sessions.103  The two congressional sessions—the 97th and 
106th—were selected because they reflected variation in several important 
variables, including the party in control of Congress, enactment rate, and 
enactment rate by bill type.  
I developed a database including all legislative hearings held by 
Congress on each of the 821 Indian -related bills in the two congressional 
sessions to measure Indian advocacy, including tribal support and opposition.  
Committee hearings present an opportunity to study targeted advocacy on a 
specific legislative proposal and, thus, allowed me to measure Indian support 
for and opposition to proposed legislation.  I reviewed the hearings to 
determine whether any Indian witnesses testified.  I defined an Indian witness 
as any witness explicitly identifying as an Indian, Alaska Native, or Native 
Hawaiian, or testifying on behalf of an Indian tribe, an Indian nonprofit 
organization, a tribal consortium, a tribal business, and/or an Alaska for-
profit or nonprofit corporation.104  When a hearing included at least one 
Indian witness, I coded all the testimony (every witness) in the hearing.  The 
total number of witnesses coded was 2,137.105  If the hearing did not include 
any Indian witnesses, it was not coded because it did not include any Indian 
advocacy.  Of the 821 bills, 204, or 25%, had hearings. 106  Of the 204 bills 
with hearings, half, 54% (110), included testimony from an Indian witness. 
I coded all the witnesses in each legislative hearing with an Indian 
witness, including the oral statements, responses to questions, and written 
statements.107  I coded each witness by the witness’s affiliation (e.g., tribe, 
 
 102. I conducted research on Indian-related bills with files retained by the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs and the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs at the Center for Legislative 
Archives.  I also reviewed files on or related to legislation in the National Congress of American 
Indians archives (1933–1990) at the Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian 
Archives Center. 
 103. The original database included 7799 Indian-related bills introduced in the 94th through the 
112th Congresses.  Carlson, Congress and Indians, supra note 101, at 95–98.  
 104. Representatives of state, local, or federal agencies (for example, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs) were not counted as Indian witnesses even if the witness identified as Indian and spoke to 
the Indian issues in the bill because the witness was not representing Indians.  For similar reasons, 
I also excluded friends of the Indians, for example, non-profits that seek to assist Indians but are not 
made up of Indians, such as the Friends Committee on National Legislation. 
 105. There are no issues of intercoder reliability because the same coder coded all the hearings 
in the two Congresses. 
 106. On average, committees hold hearings on only one-sixth of all bills introduced.  ESKRIDGE, 
ET AL., supra note 54, at 25. 
 107. The position of each witness, whether Indian or non-Indian, was coded.  For a similar 
coding scheme, see BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 134–43. 
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tribal consortium, state, etc.);108 the witness’s position on the bill (for, for but 
raises issues, against, against but prefers alternative, no position);109 and the 
committee holding the hearing. 
This coding scheme allowed me to identify and analyze the different 
strategies and positions that Indian witnesses took on each bill.110  I 
aggregated the positions taken by Indian witnesses on the bills into three 
categories: (1) proponents, who were for the bill and wanted it enacted; (2) 
opponents, who were against the bill and wanted it defeated; and (3) 
modifiers, who wanted to amend the bill.111  Each bill was already coded by 
bill number, Congress, title, date of introduction, bill progress, enactment, 
type of legislation, and subject matter.112 
I then conducted a more substantial, qualitative review of the legislative 
histories of each bill.  This review included a close reading of the hearing 
testimony to determine the grounds upon which witnesses supported, 
opposed, or wanted the bill modified; to identify any amendments made to 
the bills after the hearing process, including whether the bill was combined 
with another bill or superseded either by a substitute, related, or companion 
bill; and to check to see if any of the bills were miscoded.113  I also gathered 
other committee hearings, committee reports, debates on the floor, and 
archival materials on the bill where available.114  I used textual analysis to 
compare the language in various versions of a bill to determine whether and 
 
 108. I coded witnesses into the following affiliations: tribe, tribal consortium, Indian non-profit 
association, tribal business, Indian individual, Alaska for profit corporation, Alaska non-profit 
corporation, Native Hawaiian, non-Indian organization, federal agency, White House, state 
government, member of Congress, individual, and other.  Detailed information on the coding of 
these affiliations is available from the author upon request. 
 109. I coded each of these positions as follows: (1) For: the witness indicated that they were in 
favor of the bill and wanted it enacted without any changes to it; (2) For, but raises issues: the 
witness stated that they supported the bill, but suggested changes it; (3) Against: the witness opposed 
the enactment of the bill and did not ask for any changes to it; (4) Against, but prefers an alternative: 
the witness indicated opposition to the bill and suggested amendments or alternatives to it; and (5) 
No position: the witness did not take a position on the bill. 
 110. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 134–40. 
 111. The modifier category includes all the witnesses requesting changes to the bill and 
originally coded as either “for, raises issues” or “against, prefers alternative.” 
 112. For a full discussion of the coding of the bills in the database, see Carlson, Congress and 
Indians, supra note 101, at Appendix 1. 
 113. I checked the initial coding to ensure that none of the bills had been miscoded due to actions 
taken by Congress after the hearing. 
 114. Not all of these materials were available for each bill.  Some bills never progressed beyond 
the hearings stage, so no committee reports, or floor debates exist for them.  The availability of 
archival and supplemental materials also varied by bill.  Archival materials were only available for 
the bills in the 97th Congress.  Supplemental materials existed on some, but not all bills, in both the 
97th and 106th Congresses. 
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how arguments made by advocates at hearings were incorporated into 
specific bills. 
I used an interpretive approach in reviewing the congressional 
testimony.  An interpretative approach seeks “to understand how specific 
human beings in particular times and locales make sense of their worlds.”115  
I employed this approach to develop an understanding more sensitive to that 
of the advocates themselves of what they expressed they were doing in 
pursuing a particular position and to situate their strategies, positions, and 
arguments in the larger political and social context.116  I closely read 
congressional testimony and archival materials, when available, to identify 
Indian advocates’ strategies, positions, and arguments and their motivations 
and goals for using that strategy, taking that position, or making that 
argument.  I investigated the discourses used by Indian advocates in 
congressional testimony on a specific legislative proposal.  I traced the 
interactions and negotiations among advocates and lawmakers over time to 
observe how advocates use different strategies, tactics, and arguments to 
negotiate compromises across a range of bills with varying subject matters.  
As a result, I was able to gain a deeper understanding of how negotiations 
among advocates and legislators developed and changed over time as they 
crafted specific laws. 
C. Limitations 
Several limitations exist to this study.  First, the data only represent 
legislative advocacy at committee hearings, one of multiple stages in the 
legislative process.117  Testimony given at congressional hearings reflects 
only a small part of legislative advocacy.  They do not represent the full 
record of advocacy on a bill, which would include informal contacts and 
letters to members of Congress.  I addressed this issue by drawing on 
supplemental data sources, such as archival materials or interviews, to 
augment the hearing data and provide a more complete picture of the 
advocacy effort.   
Committee hearings also may reflect more the preferences of the 
committee than the advocacy of the witness.118  Some Indian nations and 
 
 115. PEREGRINE SCHWARTZ-SHEA AND DEVORA YANOW, INTERPRETIVE RESEARCH DESIGN: 
CONCEPTS AND PROCESSES 10 (2012). 
 116. Robert Adcock, Generalization in Comparative and Historical Social Science: The 
Difference that Interpretivism Makes, in INTERPRETATION AND METHOD: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
METHODS AND THE INTERPRETIVE TURN 91 (Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea eds., 2d 
ed. 2014). 
 117. For a description of the stages in the legislative process, see supra note 54 and 
accompanying text. 
 118. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 104.  
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organizations may not have been able to testify at committee hearings due to 
the costs and time involved—even if the Committee invited them to testify.  
To address these concerns, I reviewed both solicited and unsolicited 
testimony by Indian advocates at committee hearings and used additional 
sources to confirm my findings. 
Second, this study only explores Indian advocacy within the era of 
Tribal Self-Determination.  It presents snapshots of Indian advocacy during 
this period because it only includes data from two Congresses.  While efforts 
were made to select a cross-section of Congresses,119 my data may not 
represent all the advocacy strategies used by Indian advocates over time.  
A third limit to this study is that it does not attempt to evaluate fully or 
systematically the effects of American Indian advocacy.  While that question 
is important and merits close investigation, this study has a more limited 
purpose: to provide a more accurate description of advocate behavior.  It 
seeks to identify and examine strategies, positions, and arguments used by 
Indian advocates.  It only makes preliminary insights into the influence of 
American Indian advocacy on legislative outcomes by determining the extent 
to which the changes requested by Indian advocates were incorporated into 
enacted laws.120   
V. NEGOTIATING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AMERICAN INDIAN 
LEGISLATIVE ADVOCACY 
This Part uses the approach described in Part IV to provide a more 
accurate description of how American Indian advocates behaved and used 
the law in the legislative process during the 97th and 106th Congresses.  My 
data reveal that legislative advocates perceive the legislative process to be 
about modifying the substantive content of a proposed law.  They often 
negotiate the legislative process by targeting and framing their advocacy in 
nuanced ways and employing the rhetoric of the law—legal frames and 
arguments—to shape legislation.   
American Indian advocates, like advocacy groups generally, regularly 
testified on proposed federal laws related to their interests.  Of the 2,137 
witnesses on the 110 bills coded, 45%, were Indian advocates.121  Interest 
group studies have found that organized interests in general comprise 35.5% 
 
 119. See supra Part IV.B. 
 120. I preliminarily measure influence in this study by comparing the changes requested by 
Indian advocates with the amendments made to the bill and the text of the final bill as enacted.  
Future articles will investigate the relationship between advocacy and influence more thoroughly.  
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Beyond Descriptive Representation: American Indian Opposition to 
Federal Legislation (forthcoming). 
 121. Over one-third, 37% (355 out of 954), of these Indian advocates represented Indian nations. 
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of all witnesses on federal bills so Indian advocates may be more likely to 
testify on bills that affect them.122  Other witnesses testifying on Indian-
related bills have affiliations similar to those testifying on federal legislation 
generally.123  They included non-Indian organizations, federal agencies, state 
government officials, members of Congress, and non-Indian individuals.  
Figure 1 displays the breakdown of witnesses testifying on Indian-related 
bills by organizational affiliation.124 
 
 
Figure 1: Witnesses Testifying on Indian-related Bills by 
Organizational Affiliation 
 


































Number of witnesses = 2137 
 
 
 122. BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 103. 
 123. Id. 
 124. In comparison to a general study of advocacy on federal legislation, Indian-related bills 
generate more testimony from state or local governments and federal agencies and less advocacy 
from members of Congress, non-Indian individuals, and interest organizations.  Burstein, supra note 
39, at 103. 
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Indian advocates engaged in a wide range of advocacy strategies to 
shape the law as they negotiated the legislative process.  Similar to interest 
groups, American Indians regularly testified in support of bills that they 
favored and against bills that they did not want to see enacted.125  As Figure 
2 shows, half of Indian witnesses were proponents.  In contrast, only 20% of 
Indian witnesses acted as opponents. 
Contrary to recent studies, which have emphasized legislative advocates 
as acting as either proponents or opponents,126 my data reveal that Indian 
advocates often had a third choice: to engage in the lawmaking process to 
shape laws that better reflect their interests.  Modifiers differ from both 
proponents and opponents in the positions they take, arguments they make, 
and tactics they use in the legislative process.  Perceiving the legislative 
process as interactive and negotiable, Indian modifiers sought to educate 
members of Congress and craft bills that better responded to their concerns 
and interests.  Over a quarter, 28%, of Indian witnesses sought to modify bills 
in their testimony. 
 
Figure 2: Indian Witnesses by Position Taken on Indian-related Bills in 
Percentages 
 























 125. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 58; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115, 
143–45. 
 126. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115, 
143–45.  
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As Figure 3 shows, Indian modifiers testified on over half, 53%, of the 
bills in the dataset.  The proponent, opponent, and modification strategies 
used by Indian advocates is discussed below. 
 
Figure 3.  Positions of Indian Witnesses by Bill in Percentages 
 














Number of bills = 108* 
*Indian witnesses did not take positions on two bills in the dataset so they 
are not included.  The numbers do not add up to 108 because multiple 
Indian witnesses testified on most bills and they rarely all took the same 
position.  
A. Proponents 
As expected, and consistent with earlier studies of interest group 
behavior, Indian witnesses testified in support of proposed laws more 
frequently than they opposed them.127  Indian advocates testified for 71% and 
used a unified proponent strategy on 37% of the bills in the 97th and 106th 
Congresses.128  They supported bills on various subject matters, including 
youth, claims, culture, economic development, education, federal recognition 
of Indian groups, health care, lands, and natural resources.  Indian advocates 
most frequently testified only in support of tribe specific bills dealing with 
claims, lands, and/or natural resources.   
As my previous research shows, Indian proponents have used legislative 
advocacy to protect their tribal sovereignty, build their institutions, and 
maintain control over their lands and natural resources.129  Indian nations 
 
 127. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
 128. I generated the percentage of bills with only proponents by dividing the number of bills 
with only proponents (40) by all the bills in the dataset (108). 
 129. Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1163.  For a fuller 
discussion of how tribal proponents have employed legislative strategies to protect tribal 
sovereignty, see id. at 1177–20. 
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have advanced tribal sovereignty by initiating new policies, reversing court 
decisions, and encouraging the oversight and implementation of existing 
policies.130 
Indian proponents acted remarkably like other proponents.131  Like other 
status quo challengers, Indian proponents proposed and drafted legislation.132  
Indian advocates initiated every bill that they supported in the Congresses 
studied.  Some Indian nations and organizations drafted the bill 
themselves,133 while others proposed legislation as part of a larger 
coalition.134  Similar to proponents more generally, Indian proponents 
worked closely with members of Congress and their staffs on legislative 
language,135 mobilized the public to support their efforts,136 and emphasized 
positive arguments for changing the law in their testimony.137  
 
 130. Id. at 1174. 
 131. For a discussion of how proponents behave, see supra Part II. 
 132. See, e.g., 1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: Hearing on S. 1298 Before the Subcomm. 
on Taxation and Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin. 97th Cong. 86 (July 19, 1982) (statement of 
Barry E. Snyder, President, Seneca Indian Nation) (explaining that the Association on American 
Indian Affairs instigated the drafting of the original bill).  
 133. Id. 
 134. Tribes frequently proposed land claims and water rights settlements as part of a coalition.  
See, e.g., Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 2102, Timbisha Shoshone Homeland 
Act, 106 Cong. (Mar. 21, 2000) (explaining that the bill emerged out of negotiations between the 
National Park Service, the Tribe, and other federal agencies). 
 135. See, e.g., Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1202–08 
(describing how Indian nations worked with Senator Evans to ensure that a tribal self-governance 
demonstration project was added to the ISDEAA Amendments of 1988). 
 136. For example, the Texas Kickapoo Tribe galvanized support among the Oklahoma Kickapoo 
Tribe and local churches in their efforts to obtain federal recognition and lands.  See, e.g., Hearings 
before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affs. on H.R. 4496, Confirming the Citizenship Status 
of the Texas Band of Kickapoo Indians, 97th Cong. (Oct. 30, 1981 and Aug. 5, 1982). 
 137. For example, Indian tribes argued that Indian Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982 
was essential to the realization of tribal self-determination.  1981–82 Miscellaneous Tax Bills, XVI: 
Hearing on S. 1298 Before the Subcomm. on Tax’n and Debt Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Fin. 97th 
Cong. 71–72 (July 19, 1982) (statement of Delbert Frank, Sr., Chairman, Confederated Tribes of 
the Warm Springs Reservation) (“This legislation is extremely important to all Indian tribal 
governments.”), id. at 136 (statement of the National Congress of American Indians); consistent 
with recent federal legislation recognizing tribes as separate sovereigns, id. at 72 (statement of 
Delbert Frank, Sr., Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation), and 
necessary to ensure equal treatment for state and tribal governments in the United States.  Id. at 73 
(statement of Delbert Frank, Sr., Chairman, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation); 
id. at 139 (statement of the National Congress of American Indians); id. at 131 (statement of Darrell 
“Chip” Wadena, Minnesota Chippewa Tribe); id. at 132 (statement of W. Richard West, Jr., 
Association on American Indian Affairs).  At the same time, they pointed out that the bill would not 
lead to a significant revenue loss to the United States.  Id. at 139–40 (statement of the National 
Congress of American Indians).  
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B. Opponents 
Indian advocates testified against 21%, but only uniformly opposed 3% 
of the bills with Indian testimony in the 97th and 106th Congresses.138  
Similar to other opponents, they used an opposition strategy to prevent the 
bill’s enactment and protect the status quo.139 Most often, Indian advocates 
opposed the proposed federal law because they thought it would harm the 
interests of the tribe or Indian people.140  Indian advocates employed 
opposition strategies to defeat bills that would limit Indian gaming under the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,141 extinguish Indian land claims,142 
undermine protections for subsistence practices of Native peoples,143 allow 
 
 138. I generated the percentage of bills with only opponents by dividing the number of bills with 
only opponents (3) by all the bills in the dataset (108).  The three bills that Indian witnesses 
uniformly opposed are the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000, H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 
(2000), the Steelhead Protection Act, 97th Cong. (1981), and the Indian Land Consolidation Act 
Amendments of 2000, 106th Cong. (1999).  Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, 
and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Com. on H.R. 3125, Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 
2000, 106th Cong. (June 15, 2000); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 984, the 
Steelhead Trout Prot. Act, Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981); Joint Hearing before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affs. and the H. Comm. on Res. on S. 1586, Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments 
of 2000, 106th Cong. (Nov. 4, 1999). 
 139. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 115 (describing how opponents seek to protect the 
status quo). 
 140. See, e.g., Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecom., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. 
Comm. on Com. on H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 59-61 (June 15, 2000) (statement of Richard Williams, 
Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians); Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 984, the Steelhead Trout Prot. Act, Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981); 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on the Ancient Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, S. 
2084, 97th Cong. (June 23, 1982); Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Indian Affs. on Alaska Native 
Claims Technical Amendments Act of 1999, S. 2214, 106th Cong. (Mar. 31, 1982) (statement of Gu-
vo District of the Tohono O’odham Nation); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. 
on the Alaska Native Claims Technical Amendments Act of 1999, S. 1702, 106th Cong. (Oct. 14, 
1999) (statement of the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. 
on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 399, 106 Cong. (Mar. 24, 1999) 
(statement of Montie Deer, Chairman, National Indian Gaming Commission); Hearing before the 
H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affs. on the Tribal-State Compact Act of 1981, H.R. 5001, 97th 
Cong. (Mar. 18, 1982) (statement of the American Indian Law Center). 
 141. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. 
on Com. on H.R. 3125, 106th Cong. 59-61 (June 15, 2000) (statement of Richard Williams, 
Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians); Hearing before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affs. on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 399, 106 
Cong. (Mar. 24, 1999). 
 142. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on the Ancient Indian Land Claims Settlement 
Act, S. 2084, 97th Cong. (June 23, 1982). 
 143. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res. on the Alaska Native Claims 
Technical Amendments Act of 1999, S. 1702, 106th Cong. (Oct. 14, 1999) (statement of the Alaska 
Inter-Tribal Council). 
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for drilling for oil on sacred lands,144 and abrogate treaty fishing rights.145  
Indian advocates also cited the lack of a need for the legislation in explaining 
their opposition to bills.146  Indian advocates used opposition strategies to 
defeat tribe specific bills, pan-tribal bills, and general bills that affected their 
interests. 
In opposing these bills, Indian opponents engaged in tactics and made 
arguments typical of other opponents seeking to protect the status quo.  As 
previous studies have shown, opponents focus on the shortcomings of the 
proposed law, highlighting how much it costs and how it will not solve the 
targeted problem.147  Similarly, Indian advocates who opposed a bill 
discredited the proponent’s arguments by emphasizing how these bills would 
violate existing federal laws and tribal rights.  Like other opponents, they also 
raised fears about the bills’ potential impacts on tribal and other 
communities.148  
The Steelhead Trout Protection Act demonstrates how Indian nations 
and organizations opposing a bill with the singular goal of defeating the bill 
acted like other opponents.149  The Act would have decommercialized 
steelhead trout, designated it as a national game fish, and made commercial 
interstate transportation of the fish illegal under federal law.150  It would also 
have abrogated treaties between the federal government and Indian nations 
by applying state laws and regulations governing the harvest, transportation, 
 
 144. Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on Indian Affs. on Alaska Native Claims Technical 
Amendments Act of 1999, S. 2214, 106th Cong. (Mar. 31, 1982) (statement of Gu-vo District of the 
Tohono O’odham Nation). 
 145. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 984, the Steelhead Trout Protection Act, 
Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981).   
 146. See, e.g., Hearing before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on the Tribal-State 
Compact Act of 1981, H.R. 5001, 97th Cong. (Mar. 18, 1982) (statement of the American Indian 
Law Center); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 5108, Indian Tribal Justice 
Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, 106 Cong. (Sept. 29, 1999) (statement of the Navajo 
Nation). 
 147. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 138 (explaining that status quo defenders “[r]aise 
doubts and fears, especially about cost to government, costs to private sector actors, and the 
feasibility of any government solution to what is probably an exaggerated problem in any case” and 
that status quo defenders “need not explain the benefits of the status quo, they need only cast doubt 
on the policy alternatives being proposed.”).  The study also considered the influence of advocacy 
group opposition on policymaking and found that it was not a predictor of policy success or failure.  
Id. at 76; see also Burstein, supra note 39, at 148 (listing arguments made by opponents to federal 
legislation). 
 148. Id. at 138. 
 149. Steelhead Trout Protection Act, S. 874, 97th Cong. (1981).  A related bill to the Steelhead 
Trout Protection Act, H.R. 2978, was introduced in the House, but the House never held a hearing 
on the bill.   
 150. Id. 
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and sale of steelhead trout to Indian fishermen exercising their treaty rights.151  
Twenty-six Indian witnesses opposed the proposed law.152  Seventeen Indian 
nations and eight tribal organizations testified against the Steelhead Trout 
Protection Act at the hearing held by the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
in June 1981.153  None of these Indian nations and organizations sought to 
amend the bill.154  Instead, they mobilized to defeat the bill.155   
Tribes opposed the bill because it would unilaterally abrogate their 
treaty rights to fish commercially even though the Supreme Court had 
repeatedly upheld these rights.156  Rather than offer amendments, Indian 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, the Steelhead Trout Protection Act, 
Part I, 97th Cong. (June 29, 1981) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 874, Part I].   
 153. Id.  The seventeen Indian nations that testified against the bill are: Makah Indian Tribe, 
Quinault Indian Nation, Nez Perce Tribe, Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation, 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, Tulalip Tribes of Washington, Quileute 
Indian Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, Sauk-Suiattle Indian 
Tribe, Lummi Indian Nation, Hoh Tribe, Nisqually Tribe of Washington State, Muckleshoot Indian 
Tribe, Puyallup Tribe of Washington, Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indians, and Ak-Chin Indian 
Community.  The eight tribal organizations that opposed the bill are: Point No Point Treaty Council, 
Point Elliot Treaty Council and Fisheries Manager, Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, 
Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, Quinault Treaty Area, Skagit System Cooperative, 
Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association.  
Many reiterated their opposition to the bill at the second hearing held in September 1981. Hearing 
before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part II, 97th Cong. (Sept. 28, 1981) [hereinafter 
Hearing on S. 874, Part II].   
 154. See generally Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part I, 97th Cong. 
(June 29, 1981); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part II, 97th Cong. (Sept. 
28, 1981).   
 155. Id.  Several Indian nations and organizations also submitted letters to Senators to reiterate 
their opposition to the bill.  See, e.g., Letter from Gilbert King George, Chairman, Muckleshoot 
Tribal Council to Senator John Melcher, March, 16, 1982, National Archives, The Center for 
Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files on S. 874 (asking for the Senator’s 
support in opposing S. 874); Letter from Elmer Savilla, Executive Director, National Tribal 
Chairman’s Association to Senator John Melcher, Feb. 1, 1982, National Archives, The Center for 
Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files on S. 874 (adamantly opposing S. 
874 because it “is intended as a direct abrogation of Pacific Northwest Indian commercial fishing 
rights so that sportsman may enjoy sole access to this steelhead resource.”); Letter from the National 
Congress of American Indians to Senator John Melcher, Feb. 8, 1982, National Archives, The 
Center for Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files on S. 874 (stating that 
every American Indian tribe in the United States opposes S. 874 because the bill “would directly 
abrogate Pacific Northwest Indian tribal fishing rights upheld twice by the Supreme Court in the 
last decade.”). 
 156. See, e.g. Hearing on S. 874, Part II, supra note 153, at 104 (statement of Chris Morganroth, 
Quileute Tribe); id. at 68–69 (statement of Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries 
Commission); id. at 141 (statement of Mary K. Leitka, Chairwoman, Hoh Indian Tribe); Hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs on S. 874, Part I, 97th Cong. 62 (June 29, 1981) 
(statement of Gary Peterson, Point No Point Treaty Council); id. at 66 (statement of Dale Johnson, 
Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission).  Many of the tribes emphasized their 
reliance on fishing for economic, spiritual, and cultural purposes.  See, e.g., Hearing. on S. 874, 
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nations and organizations revealed the misleading statistics and arguments 
relied on by the state of Washington and other supporters of the bill and 
attempted to correct the record.157  They emphasized how the bill would 
 
Part II, supra note 153, at 98–99 (Sept. 28, 1981) (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault Nation); 
id. at 69 (statement of Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission) (“For some tribes, 
steelhead serve as the ‘bread and butter’ salmon, the main source of income. For all tribes, steelhead 
and salmon are essential in sustaining the cultural and traditional life of the Pacific Northwest 
Indians.”); Hearing on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152, at 65 (June 29, 1981) (statement of Tony 
Forsman, Chairman, Point Elliot Treaty Council and Fisheries Manager) (“The treaty right to 
harvest steelhead is not for sale, and it cannot be bought. It is clear that steelhead is necessary for 
the survival of Indian tribes. For no amount of money will tribes trade that survival. No amount of 
money could compensate for the loss suffered by decommercializing steelhead. Tribal fishermen do 
not want to be paid not to fish. They do not seek welfare. They want to fish.”); id. at 66 (statement 
of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (“The Makah people 
have been dependent on fishing since time immemorial. Today, fishing is still the most important 
livelihood for our people.”); id. at 80 (statement of Nelson Wallulatum, Confederated Tribes of the 
Warm Springs Reservation) (“Taking steelhead, like taking salmon, is at the heart of Warm Springs 
culture. We are river people and we are fishermen. Catching these fish is not sport or recreation. It 
is our way of life.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Hearing  on S. 874, Part II, supra note 153 (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault 
Nation) (presenting detailed statistics on treaty fishing in Washington state); id. at 110–21 
(statement of Chris Morganroth, Quileute Tribe) (same); id. at 69 (statement of Billy Frank, Jr., 
Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission) (rejecting contentions that the bill is necessary for 
conservation); Hearing on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152 (statement of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty 
Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (same).  The hearings were acrimonious.  Some tribes 
accused Senator Gorton of selling out to special interests and used strong language to voice their 
displeasure, including that they were furious, found the bill and proceedings distasteful and a waste 
of money, and perceived the bill to be a political device by Senators and interest groups.  See, e.g., 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part I, 97th Cong. 66 (June 29, 1981) 
(statement of Tony Forsman, Squamish Tribe) (calling out Slade Gorton for introducing legislation 
to abrogate tribal treaty rights after saying he would abide by the Supreme Court’s decision); 
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part II, 97th Cong. 69 (Sept. 28, 1981) 
(statement of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (“Now we 
see that the man [Slade Gorton] who led an unsuccessful crusade to beat us in court wants to exploit 
our lack of political power in Congress so his constituency can take the fish which were guaranteed 
to us by the United States by solemn promises made on the treaty grounds.”); id. at 69 (statement 
of Billy Frank, Jr., Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission) (“Your bill, Mr. Chairman [Slade 
Gorton], is another attempt to abrogate the treaties between the United States and tribal 
governments.”); id. at 97 (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault Nation) (“Arguments supporting 
the bill are fraught with . . . misrepresentation. As an example, consider the statement that was made 
by you, Mr. Chairman [Slade Gorton], in the introduction of S. 874, which contains highly 
misleading statistics that are apparently intended to deceive the public and the Congress, in thinking 
that Indians are overfishing the resource because they may account for more than 50 percent of the 
catch taken from certain rivers.”).  Others noted their frustration with the attempt of a special interest 
to abrogate their treaty rights.  See, e.g., Hearing. on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152 (statement of 
Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish Commission) (noting that “a vocal and 
well-financed minority has been clamoring to take away our rights for years” and that “this bill is 
just the latest in a long line of bills supported by this lobby and introduced to steal our rights.”); id. 
at 68 (statement of Joe DeLaCruz, Quinault Nation) (“I find it extremely distasteful and 
objectionable to have to participate in this process.  I have appeared . . . not out of choice, but out 
of necessity.  The anger and dismay of my people over the shameful attempt to benefit the recreation 
of a few sportsmen by breaking the treaty promises made to our forefathers deserves to be heard.”).  
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violate the law by abrogating treaty rights and would express congressional 
bad faith towards Indians.158  The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs chose 
not to take further action on the bill, and the bill never made it out of 
committee.159 
The Steelhead Trout Protection Act is one example of how Indian 
nations and organizations used an opposition strategy to defeat a bill that they 
felt undermined their rights.  It illustrates how Indian advocates strongly and 
uniformly oppose proposed legislation that threatens their sovereign rights.160  
If Congress had enacted the Steelhead Trout Protection Act, it would have 
undermined tribal sovereignty, abrogated treaty fishing rights, dramatically 
altered existing federal Indian law, and devastated tribal economies.161  In 
response, Indian nations and organizations mobilized to defeat the threat.  
They sought to protect the status quo to prevent major changes to existing 
laws that recognized and protected their sovereignty.  Not all of the bills in 
the dataset generated as much opposition as the Steelhead Trout Protection 
Act.  But the arguments made by Indian nations and organizations against the 
bill resemble both the kinds of arguments made by opponents generally and 
by other Indian opponents seeking to protect the status quo and defeat a 
proposed law. 
C. Modifiers 
Modifiers illuminate how legislative advocates perceive the legislative 
process to be about changing the substantive law.  Rather than either support 
or oppose a proposed law, advocates can—and do—seek to modify its 
 
 158. Hearing on Indian Affs. on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152, at 63–65 (statement of Tony 
Forsman, Chairman, Point Elliot Treaty Council and Fisheries Manager); id. at 65 (statement of 
Tony Forsman, Squamish Tribe) (“The Tribe, in opposing this steelhead legislation are firmly 
convinced that this bill is a direct abrogation of treaty rights, and refuse that money be traded for 
this right.”); id. at 66 (statement of Dale Johnson, Makah Treaty Area, Northwest Indian Fish 
Commission) (describing the legislation as abrogating the Makah peoples’ treaty rights to benefit 
sportsmen); id. at 77 (statement of A.K. Scott, Nez Perce Tribal Chairman) (“That Congress is even 
considering this legislation is an outrage. This proposed act is a violation of lawful principles and 
legal rights.”); id. at 79-80 (statement of Nelson Wallulatum, Confederated Tribes of the Warm 
Springs Reservation) (“The Warm Springs Tribe, however, considers this a treaty abrogation bill 
and we are unalterably opposed to it. When our ancestors signed the treaty of 1855 they reserved 
for our people the right to fish at our usual and accustomed stations beyond the reservation.”). 
 159. Similar bills introduced in the 99th Congress experienced a similar fate, dying in committee.  
Steelhead Trout Protection Act, H.R. 2136, 99th Cong. (1985); Steelhead Trout Protection Act, S. 
954, 99th Cong. (1985).  
 160. See supra note 138 for a list of other bills that Indian nations and organizations opposed 
because the bill would harm their rights. 
 161. See generally Hearing on S. 874, Part II, supra note 153 (Sept. 28, 1981) (statement of 
Indian nations and organizations); Hearing on S. 874, Part I, supra note 152 (statement of Indian 
nations and organizations); Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 692, 106th Cong. 
(June 9, 1999) (statement of Indian nations and organizations). 
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provisions.  Modifiers express neither unqualified support for nor unqualified 
opposition to the bill.162  Rather, modifiers seek to influence the substantive 
content of the bill.  Contrary to recent political science studies, which 
downplay the existence of modifiers,163 Indian witnesses used modification 
strategies on 53% of the bills studied. 
Modification strategies differ from both proponent and opponent 
strategies in the positions taken, arguments made, and tactics used by the 
legislative advocates pursuing them. Modifiers often perceive their goals as 
more incremental than either opponents or proponents because they seek to 
educate members of Congress and influence the bill’s content.  Their 
advocacy appears more fluid and relational, as they sometimes change their 
position on the bill throughout the course of the legislative process.  Indian 
modifiers often targeted provisions of the bill most relevant to them or used 
the legislative process to negotiate the terms of federal Indian law and policy 
more generally.  As a result, the behavior of modifiers often differed from 
and appeared to be more strategic and complicated than that of either 
proponents or opponents. 
1. Why American Indians Use Modification Strategies 
Most frequently, Indian advocates used a modification strategy because 
they wanted to improve the law so that it better served American Indians.164  
 
 162. Modifiers used different rhetoric than proponents or opponents.  For example, while 
opponents outright opposed a bill, modifiers often focused on changing the bill to better reflect 
Indian interests.  Some even indicated their support for the general concept of the bill, but then 
raised strong concerns about specific provisions in the legislation.  See, e.g., Hearings before the S. 
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources on S. 2305, The Federal Royalty Management Act of 
1982, 97th Cong. 400 (May 8 and 17, 1982) (statement of Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes 
of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (testifying that the tribe supported changing the royalty 
management system but wanted to see Section 20 removed from the bill); Hearing before the H. 
Comm. on Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. 59 (June 
12, 1999) (statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf of Pueblo Santa Ana) (indicating that 
tribe supported the bill in theory but recommended that Title II and III of the legislation be amended 
to provide grants to Indian Tribes without any cost match or in the alternative to make the maximum 
cost share requirement for Indian tribes to be twenty-five percent). 
 163. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
 164. See, e.g., Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Education 
and Labor on H.R. 3046, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong. (April 29, 1981) 
(statement of the National Congress of American Indians) (requesting that Congress amend the bill 
to remove certain barriers to participation for Indian elders); Hearing before the H. Comm. on 
Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) 
(statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf of Pueblo Santa Ana) (recommending that Title 
II and III of the legislation be amended to provide grants to Indian Tribes without any cost match 
or, in the alternative, to make the maximum cost share requirement for Indian tribes to be twenty-
five percent); Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R.  798, the Resources 2000 Act, 
106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) (Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf of Pueblo Santa Ana) (requesting 
that the amount allocated to tribes be increased to twenty percent of the total and that the maximum 
  
994 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:960 
 
Indian advocates sought to improve all three kinds of Indian-related bills—
pan-tribal, tribe specific, and general.  Indian modifiers provided information 
on Indian experiences that enabled legislators to enact laws more responsive 
to the conditions in Indian country.  They frequently suggested alternative 
language or ideas, sometimes even draft amendments, during the hearings.165  
As discussed in more detail below, Indian advocates varied in their 
commitments to the suggestions they made.  Some refused to support the bill 
unless their proposed changes were incorporated into it while others would 
have supported the bill even if the changes they proposed were rejected. 
As modifiers, Indian advocates could—and often did—provide 
information to Congress about proposed laws on which they were not major 
stakeholders.166  They employed modification strategies to negotiate for 
language and/or provisions that they preferred on bills that affected regional 
or national policies.  Unlike proponents and opponents, Indian advocates 
frequently did not express a strong position in favor of or against a general 
bill, but rather targeted their advocacy to educate members of Congress about 
how specific provisions of the bill would affect them and could be improved 
to serve them better. 
Indian advocates identified multiple ways that Congress could respond 
more effectively to conditions on the ground in Indian country.  Some of their 
suggestions included Congress increasing funding available to Indians for 
programs,167 refining existing programs to better serve Indians,168 improving 
 
grant amount for any one tribe in a fiscal year be increased to twenty percent); Joint hearings before 
the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the S. 
Comm. on Environment and Public Works on S. 1662, the National Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, 97th Cong. (Oct. 5–6, 1981) [hereinafter Joint Hearings on S. 1662] (statement of Russell 
Jim, The Council on Energy Resource Tribes) (suggesting that Congress amend the bill to improve 
effective participation by tribes). 
 165. See, e.g., Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and 
Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) (statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf 
of Pueblo Santa Ana); Joint hearings before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and 
the Subcomm. on Nuclear Regulation of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works on S. 
1662, the National Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 97th Cong. (Oct. 5–6, 1981) (statement of 
Russell Jim, The Council on Energy Resource Tribes). 
 166. See, e.g., Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Education 
and Labor on H.R. 3046, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong. (April 29, 1981) 
(statement of the National Congress of American Indians) (requesting that Congress amend the bill 
to remove certain barriers to participation for Indian elders). 
 167. Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 798, the Resources 2000 Act, 106th 
Cong. (June 12, 1999) (Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, Pueblo Santa Ana) (requesting that the amount 
allocated to tribes be increased). 
 168. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Lab. on 
H.R. 3046, Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong. (April 29, 1981) (statement of 
the National Congress of American Indians) (requesting amendments to the bill to enable more 
Indian communities to receive Title VI benefits, lower the eligibility age requirements to allow the 
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the oversight and/or implementation of existing programs,169 altering the 
scheme for making grants to Indian nations or organizations,170 and taking 
actions to increase tribal participation in a new program.171 
2. How Modifiers Advocate: Positions, Tactics, and Arguments 
Modifiers behave differently than either proponents or opponents 
because they aim to influence the substantive content of the legislative 
proposal.  In short, for modifiers, it’s all about the text.  Like proponents, 
they advocate for changes in the law, but the changes they seek focus on 
specific provisions in a bill.  Modifiers recommend different kinds of changes 
to proposed laws depending on how the bill affects them.  Thus, they 
frequently take positions, use tactics, and make arguments that distinguish 
them from both proponents and opponents and aid them in their quest to 
improve a legislative text to serve their community more effectively.  Each 
of the sections below describes some of the positions, tactics, and arguments 
employed by Indian advocates acting as modifiers.  
a. Positions Taken by Modifiers 
Unlike proponents and opponents, who clearly expressed either support 
or opposition for a proposed law, Indian advocates often approached a 
proposed law in a more nuanced and sophisticated way.  Rarely did Indian 
modifiers take a position either unconditionally for or against a bill.  Rather, 
Indian modifiers took a range of positions on proposed laws.  Indian 
advocates’ positions on a proposed law often depended on how they wanted 
members of Congress to alter the law.  They varied both in the 
recommendations that they made and their commitments to those 
recommendations.  
Indian modifiers displayed a continuum of positions with most 
modifiers falling into one of four distinct categories.172  These positions 
 
majority of Indian elders to qualify for the program, and make the dietary recommendations more 
accommodating of traditional diets). 
 169. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. on S. 400, NAHASDA Amendments of 2000, 
106th Cong. (March 17, 1999) (statement of Chester Carl, Chairman, National American Indian 
Housing Council) (recommending that Congress amend the bill to improve implementation of the 
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act). 
 170. Hearing before the H. Comm. on Resources on H.R. 701, the Conservation and 
Reinvestment Act, 106th Cong. (June 12, 1999) (statement of Leslie Ramirez, Attorney, on behalf 
of Pueblo Santa Ana) (recommending that Title II and III of the legislation be amended to provide 
grants to Indian Tribes without any cost match or, in the alternative, to make the maximum cost 
share requirement for Indian tribes to be 25 percent). 
 171. See Joint Hearings on S. 1662, supra note 164.  
 172. These categories are meant to representative rather than exhaustive. 
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include: (1) supporting the bill but preferring some changes, (2) only 
supporting the bill if the requested changes are made, (3) preferring an 
alternative version of the bill, and (4) wanting something done but expressing 
deep concerns about the bill as drafted.  Figure 4 displays this continuum of 
positions taken by Indian modifiers.173  Often advocate behavior depended 
on their position on the bill.  Unlike opponents and proponents, modifiers’ 
positions were relational rather than fixed and could change throughout the 
legislative process based on interactions with legislators and other political 
actors.174  The following subsections illustrate these varying positions and 
discuss each in more depth.  
 
Figure 4: Continuum of Positions of Indian Witnesses Wishing to 
Modify a Bill 
 
i. Support the Bill, but Prefer Some Changes 
Just under half, 47%, of Indian witnesses using a modification strategy 
indicated that they supported the proposed law and also requested changes to 
it.175  Often these modifiers advocated for minor changes to the proposed law, 
and it was not clear that their support for the bill depended upon the changes 
being made.  Sometimes the Indian advocate recommended amendments to 
the bill but indicated support for it regardless of whether those changes were 
made.   
The National Indian Health Board’s (“NIHB”) advocacy on the Native 
American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 2000 
 
 173. For a continuum of all positions taken by Indian advocates, see supra Part VI.   
 174. Ziv, supra note 53, at 212–13 (discussing how legislative advocates’ positions are often 
relational). 
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illustrates how an Indian organization supported a proposed law while 
arguing that it could be improved to serve Indian country more effectively.  
The Native American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation 
Act of 2000 sought to enable Indian tribes to consolidate and integrate 
alcohol and other substance abuse programs into one program.176  The NIHB, 
a nonprofit organization representing tribal governments,177 testified in 
support of the bill, but strongly recommended that the Indian Health Service 
(“IHS”) rather than the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) serve as the lead 
agency in implementing and overseeing programs consolidated under the 
law.178  The NIHB argued for the IHS to take the lead because alcoholism is 
a disease that affects physical and behavioral health.179  The IHS had already 
engaged in numerous programs related to alcohol and substance abuse, and 
the NIHB expressed concerns that these initiatives would be derailed if the 
BIA became the lead agency.180  The NIHB’s recommendation to make the 
IHS the lead agency was uncontroversial.  None of the other witnesses 
opposed the idea, and both the Department of the Interior and the IHS agreed 
that the IHS was the appropriate agency to coordinate these programs.181  The 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs made the requested change during 
committee markup,182 and the amended bill was later enacted. 
The NIHB’s advocacy on the Native American Alcohol and Substance 
Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 2000 shows how even advocates 
supportive of a bill see the legislative process as an opportunity to improve 
the legislative text to better serve their constituents.  The NIHB supported the 
bill, but also cared deeply about specific provisions within it and requested 
 
 176. Native American Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act of 2000, S. 
1507, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 177. The NIHB represents both tribal governments who compact or contract with the federal 
government to operate their own health care delivery systems and those who receive health care 
directly from the Indian Health Service.  NATIONAL INDIAN HEALTH BOARD, About NIHB, 
https://www.nihb.org/about_us/about_us.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).  
 178. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 1507, 106th Cong. 24 (Oct. 13, 1999) 
(statement of Yvette Joseph-Fox, Executive Director, National Indian Health Board) (“The National 
Indian Health Board supports the intent of S. 1507, as we support the desire of tribal governments 
to consolidate many of their programs into a flexible and responsible program at the local level.  
However, we strongly recommend that the primary agency responsible for Federal oversight of 
these consolidated programs be the Department of Health and Human Services’ Indian Health 
Service program.”). 
 179. Id. at 24–25. 
 180. Id. at 46.  The NIHB also pointed out that tribes found it easier to contract and compact 
with the IHS.  Id. at 46–47. 
 181. Alcohol and Substance Abuse Program Consolidation Act: Hearing on S. 1507 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 14 (1999) (statement of Kevin Gover, U.S. Department of 
the Interior).  Id. at 15 (statement of Michel Lincoln, Indian Health Service). 
 182. S. REP. NO. 106-306, at 5 (2000) (explaining that the bill was amended to designate the 
Indian Health Service the lead agency for coordinating the program). 
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changes to it.  They treated the legislative process like an interactive 
negotiation over the bill’s substantive content.  In this case, their advocacy 
appears to have paid off; the Senate Committee changed the bill in response 
to their concerns.  Not all suggestions to amend a bill are as uncontroversial 
and easily made as the ones requested by the NIHB in this case.  But many 
modifiers who support a bill also simultaneously seek to change it, albeit 
sometimes in minor ways.  The inclination of Indian advocates to make even 
minor suggestions to alter a bill they support indicates how they see the 
legislative process as an opportunity to influence the content of proposed 
legislation. 
ii. Only Support the Bill if Changes are Made 
Some Indian modifiers clearly indicated that they would only support a 
proposed law if Congress made the changes to the law that they 
recommended.  Indian advocates often took this position when they 
perceived the bill as drafted as problematic and harmful to their interests.  
Many preferred to oppose the bill if it could not be changed.  Some modifiers 
took this position to mitigate the harm to Indian nations and peoples in the 
event the law passed.  Their tactic seemed to be: if the bill cannot be defeated, 
it can at least be altered to harm Indian nations and peoples less.  These 
mitigation tactics were often employed by tribal governments and 
organizations to protect their existing tribal rights.183 
The modification strategy used by the Osage Tribal Council on H.R. 
4926 serves as an example of advocates only supporting the enactment of a 
proposed law if specific changes were made before its enactment.184  H.R. 
 
 183. See, e.g., Rail Safety and Service Improvement Act of 1982: Hearing on H.R. 6308 Before 
the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands and Nat’l Parks, 97th Cong. 251 (1982) (statement of Alaska 
Federation of Natives, Inc.); Internet Gaming Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 692 Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 66–68 (1999) (statement of Richard Williams, 
Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians). 
 184. For other examples of Indian advocates taking a similar position, see Hearing on S. 1340 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 10–12 (1981) (statement of Ted George, 
representing Port Gamble Indian Community, Lower Elwha Tribal Community, and Jamestown 
Band of Clallam Indians) (expressing deep dissatisfaction with the bill and requesting amendments 
to it); Hearing on S. 1986 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 12 (1982) (statement 
of John Capture, on behalf of the Gros Ventre Tribe of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation) 
(requesting that bill be amended to specify which individuals were to receive per capita payments); 
Id. at 14 (statement of Gilbert Horn, on behalf of the Assiniboine Tribe of the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation) (calling for bill to be amended to exempt payments from taxes).  Like the Osage Tribal 
Council, these Tribes refused to support the bill until Congress amended it to make the changes they 
requested.  Once Congress made the changes, their positions shifted to support the bill. S. REP. NO. 
97–654, at 2 (1982) (detailing changes to the S. 1349 that responded to concerns raised by the 
Clallam tribes); S. REP. NO. 97–492, at 3 (1982) (indicating that amendments to S. 1986 were 
adopted after consultation with the tribes). 
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4926 authorized the Secretary of the Army to acquire interests in mineral 
rights owned by the Osage Indians to complete construction of Lake 
Skiatook.185  The Osage Tribal Council initially requested changes to the bill 
because it did not clearly state what lands the Tribe had to cede for the 
Skiatook Reservoir or the amount of compensation the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers had to pay the Tribe for the land.186  During a hearing before the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in 1981, the Tribe suggested 
that the bill be amended to include these details.187  Subsequently, the Tribe 
entered into negotiations with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to 
determine the lands to be ceded and the amount of compensation.188  After 
the Tribe negotiated an agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to 
resolve these issues, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs  
amended H.R. 4926, and the Osage Tribal Council passed a resolution 
agreeing to support the amended bill.189   
The Osage Tribal Council’s advocacy on H.R. 4926 illustrates how 
Indian advocates may use a modification strategy to support the enactment 
of a proposed law only if specific changes are made before its enactment.  It 
demonstrates how legislative advocates view the legislative process to be a 
lawmaking enterprise.  First, the Tribe was focused on improving the 
substantive content of the bill and used what power it had to alter the bill’s 
content.  Unlike opponents who raise fears about what will happen if a bill is 
enacted, the Osage Tribal Council engaged in negotiations with the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to resolve the issues they identified in the bill.190  
Their behavior shows that Indian advocates perceive the legislative process 
as a way to negotiate bill content.  Second, it demonstrates how Indian 
modifiers see the legislative process as relational and negotiable.  The Osage 
 
 185. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Army to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, such 
interests in oil, gas, coal, and other minerals owned or controlled by the Osage Tribe of Indians as 
are needed for Skiatook Lake, Oklahoma, and for other purposes, H.R. Res. 4926, 97th Cong., 95 
Stat. 1721 (1981). 
 186. Hearing on H.R. 4926 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong. 17 
(1981) (statement of Ralph Adkisson, Attorney, Osage Tribal Council); William J. Broad, Despite 
Feds, a Tribe Keeps Its Oil Flowing, WASH. POST (June 8, 1980), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1980/06/08/despite-feds-a-tribe-keeps-its-oil-
flowing/e09c3214-fc69-4d0b-a53d-82a59a98f12c/.  
 187. See Hearing on H.R. 4926 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, supra note 
178. 
 188. Memorandum from Alex Skibine to Congressman Kildee, (Nov. 30, 1981) (on file with the 
National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, House Committee on Natural Resources 
Files on H.R. 4926). 
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 97–382, at 4–5. 
 190. Memorandum to Congressman Kildee from Alex Skibine, (Nov. 30, 1981) (on file with the 
National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs files 
on H.R. 4926). 
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Tribal Council went into the legislative process, opposing the bill and 
expecting to negotiate its provisions.  In fact, one could argue that they used 
their opposition on the bill to encourage the negotiations.  Third, the Osage 
Tribal Council’s advocacy illustrates how advocates, who are major 
stakeholders on a bill, can leverage their position on a bill to affect its 
substantive content.  In this case, the Osage Tribal Council may have been 
able to negotiate the changes it wanted because members of Congress knew 
that they could not enact the bill without the support of the Osage Tribal 
Council.191  Finally, it illuminates the relational, interactive nature of the 
legislative process and how advocates may change their position on a bill as 
they respond to and negotiate with other political actors.192  Here, the Osage 
Tribal Council shifted its position from opposing the bill and seeking 
modifications to it to supporting the bill.  The Osage Tribal Council’s 
behavior in this case was not usual.  As later case studies reiterate, Indian 
advocates pursued similar strategies on other bills. 
iii. Prefers an Alternative Bill 
Some Indian modifiers used a modification strategy because they 
preferred an alternative bill and wanted to see Congress enact the bill that 
they preferred.  Most frequently, this happened when multiple bills on the 
same subject matter were introduced in the House and the Senate at the same 
time.193  Occasionally, Indian advocates preferred a bill or provisions within 
a bill that had been introduced in a previous congressional session and used 
a modification strategy to encourage Congress to amend the latest draft bill 
to adopt provisions from an earlier bill.  
The Tohono O’odham Nation’s (then the Papago Tribe) advocacy on 
the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982 demonstrates a 
strategy used by a tribe when it preferred an alternative bill.  Members of 
Congress introduced two bills to settle the long-standing water rights claims 
 
 191. Indian advocates may also be able to use this kind of leverage when they unify in opposition 
against a bill that they perceive harms their interests.  For example, Indian advocates strongly 
opposed the Internet Gambling Regulatory Act unless it was modified to exempt Indian gaming 
under IGRA.  See, e.g., Internet Gaming Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 692 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 66–68 (1999).  The Senate responded to tribal advocacy by 
amending the bill on the floor, but the bill never passed both chambers.   
 192. Ziv, supra note 53, at 212–13. 
 193. See, e.g., The Federal Royalty Management Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S. 
Comm. On Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of Patricia Brown, 
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (testifying that the tribes preferred H.R. 
5121 to S. 2305); Water Claims of the Papago Tribe: Hearing on H.R. 5118 and S. 2118 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. 70 (1982) (statement of Max H. Norris, Chairman, Papago 
Tribe of Arizona (now Tohono O’odham Nation)). 
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of the Nation in southern Arizona.194  Drafted after several years of 
negotiations between the Nation and local stakeholders, these bills provided 
a settlement of the water rights claims of the San Xavier Papago Indian 
Reservation and the Schuk Toak District of Sells Papago Indian Reservation 
with a minimum of social and economic disruption to the Indian and non-
Indian communities in Tucson and eastern Pima County.195  The Tohono 
O’odham Nation was guaranteed an annual supply of water from specified 
sources in exchange for the settlement of its water rights claims. 
The Nation preferred the Senate version of the Southern Arizona Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 1982, S. 2114, to the House one, H.R. 5118.  S. 
2114 included a stipulation that the Bureau of Reclamation and not the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs would be the lead agency for the construction of the 
water delivery provisions and a provision that the Secretary would pay 
damages in the amount of the actual replacement cost of water if the Secretary 
could not acquire and deliver the quantities of water promised to the 
Nation.196  When it became clear that the House was going to move on H.R. 
5118, the Nation advocated to have H.R. 5118 amended to include the more 
favorable provisions in S. 2114 and testified that it would oppose the bill 
unless the changes to the bill’s language were made.197  The House 
Committee on Natural Resources amended the bill in response to the Nation’s 
concerns.198 
The legislative advocacy by the Tohono O’odham Nation is an example 
of a tribe preferring an alternative bill when the House and Senate have 
introduced similar bills on the same topic.  Like the advocacy of the NIHB 
and the Osage Tribal Council, it shows how Indian advocates view the 
legislative process as a negotiation over the legislative text.  Here, the Nation 
 
 194. Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, S. 2114, 97th Cong. (1982); 
Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982, H.R. 5118, 97th Cong. (1982).   
 195. Letter to President Reagan from Morris K. Udall, (June 4, 1982) (on file with the National 
Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, House Committee on Natural Resources, files on 
H.R. 5118). 
 196. See Water Claims of the Papago Tribe: Hearing on H.R. 5118 and S. 2118 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 185; Letter from Barry Goldwater to William Cohen, (Mar. 
31, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, files on H.R. 5118). 
 197. See Water Claims of the Papago Tribe: Hearing on H.R. 5118 and S. 2118 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, supra note 185. 
 198. H.R. REP. NO. 97-422, at 12 (1982) (“The bill as reported by this Committee is endorsed 
and supported by the major water users in eastern Pima Count[y], including the major mining 
interests and farm operations, the City of Tucson and officials of the Papago Tribe.”).  President 
Reagan vetoed the bill because the federal government had not participated in the water settlement 
negotiations.  President Reagan’s Veto Message to Congress on H.R. 5118, National Archives, The 
Center for Legislative Archives, House Committee on Natural Resources, files on H.R. 5118.  The 
bill was later added as a separate title and enacted as part of a related bill.  Pub. L. 97-293 (1982). 
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used its hearing testimony to encourage Congress to enact the provisions of 
the bill they preferred and threatened to oppose the bill if those changes were 
not made.  It also illustrates how advocates can leverage their influence over 
the text of a proposed law through the position that they take on it.  The 
Nation, like the Osage Tribal Council, used their criticisms of the bill to 
encourage members of Congress to support a bill that better suited them.  
Like the Osage Tribal Council, the Nation may have had more power in this 
case because it was a tribe -specific bill and members of Congress may have 
had reservations about enacting a bill that directly affected one tribe without 
its support.199   
iv. Raising New Issues 
Some Indian advocates appeared to engage in modification strategies 
because they wanted to raise issues related to, but not addressed in, the 
legislation.200  These modifiers used the legislative process as an opportunity 
to suggest that the proposed legislation had missed the real issues affecting 
Indian country and that members of Congress should consider approaching 
the issue in a vastly different way or address a related issue that Indian 
advocates perceived to be more important. 
The Oglala Sioux Tribe’s advocacy on the Indian Tribal Economic 
Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000 serves as an example 
of Indian modifiers raising issues related to, but not addressed in, the 
proposed legislation.201  The Indian Tribal Economic Development and 
Contract Encouragement Act of 2000 proposed amendments to 25 U.S.C. 
 
 199. The Nation may have had more leverage on this particular bill because it was a key 
stakeholder in the water rights settlement.  The water rights settlement basically could not move 
forward without the Nation’s consent. 
 200. See, e.g., Gaming Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 399 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 47 (1999) (statement of W. Ron Allen, President, National 
Congress of American Indians) (arguing that this bill was not necessary and that Congress really 
needed to enact a Seminole Fix); Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000: 
Hearing on S. 5108 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 23–24 (1999) (Navajo 
Nation arguing that Congress needed to fund tribal justice systems); To Amend the Indian 
Judgement Funds Act of 1973: Hearing on H.R. 3731 Before the H. Comm. On Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 97th Cong. 10–16 (1981) (statement of Robert T. Coulter); Indian Land Consolidation Act 
Amendments: Joint Hearing on S. 1586, S. 1315 and H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs and the H. Comm. on Resources, 106th Cong. 56–57 (1999) (statement of Delmar “Poncho” 
Bigby, Indian Land Working Group) (testifying that the bill completely ignores the needs of 
individuals and does not provide any options for individuals to consolidate land). 
 201. Business Development on Indian Lands: Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999) (statement of Harold D. Salway, President, Oglala Sioux 
Tribe).  The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation also testified on the bill.  They 
sought specific changes to the text of the bill.  Id. at 23–24.  
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§ 81, which governs contracts with Indian tribes.202  Enacted in 1872, the 
original section 81 established technical drafting requirements for and 
mandated that the Secretary of the Interior approve most contracts between 
tribal governments and non-Indians.203  The Indian Tribal Economic 
Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000 proposed changes to 
the scope and operation of section 81.  It sought to clarify which contracts 
required secretarial approval, specify the criteria for the approval of those 
contracts, and provide that contracts covered by the Act had to disclose or 
waive tribal sovereign immunity.204  The Tribe employed its testimony on 
this bill as a way to argue for the repeal of 25 U.S.C. § 81.205  It argued against 
the provisions of the bill requiring tribal governments and businesses to 
disclose or waive tribal sovereign immunity in certain contracts approved by 
the Secretary of the Interior by asserting that the Secretary should not be 
approving any contracts with Indian tribes.206  The Tribe contended that 
secretarial approval of contracts with Indian tribal governments and 
businesses had outlived its usefulness and was unnecessary because tribes are 
capable of managing and administering their own affairs.207  Most likely, the 
Tribe knew that repeal of Section 81 was unlikely, but it utilized the 
opportunity to start educating members of Congress about the competency of 
tribal governments and businesses, the problems with Section 81, and their 
desire to have the section repealed.   
The Oglala Sioux Tribe’s advocacy shows how Indian advocates use 
modification strategies to educate members of Congress about important 
issues overlooked in a proposed bill.  Like the Osage Tribal Council and 
NIHB, the Oglala Sioux Tribe saw the legislative process as interactive and 
used it to engage with members of Congress about existing laws.  The Tribe’s 
strategy also provides insights into how and why legislative advocates using 
modification strategies act differently from both proponents and opponents.  
The Tribe argued for a different approach than the one taken in the bill, but 
unlike opponents, it was not trying to protect the status quo.  Rather, the Tribe 
wanted to reform the status quo through the repeal of an existing law.  In this 
respect, their efforts resemble incremental law reform strategies used by 
 
 202. S. 613, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 203. Ann-Emily C. Gaupp, The Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts 
Encouragement Act: Smoke Signals of a New Era in Federal Indian Policy, 33 CONN. L. REV. 667, 
669–70 (2001). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Business Development on Indian Lands: Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm. 
on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999) (statement of Harold D. Salway, President, Oglala Sioux 
Tribe) (recommending repeal of section 81).  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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proponents.208  Similar to proponents, the Tribe engaged in a long-term 
strategy by trying to educate members of Congress about an issue and set the 
stage for later reforms. 
* * * 
The broad range of positions that legislative advocates take in 
advocating for modifications to proposed laws illuminate key aspects of 
advocate behavior overlooked in the present literature.  First, it suggests 
tremendous variation in how advocates seek to change proposed laws prior 
to their enactment.  Second, across this variation, commonalities in 
advocate’s behaviors and perceptions about the legislative process emerge.  
Importantly, the case studies reveal how legislative advocates, regardless of 
their position on the bill, perceive the legislative process as a lawmaking 
enterprise.  Advocates are engaged because they shape the content of the 
laws, either in terms of the bill being discussed or over the long term.  
Relatedly, they view the process as interactive and dynamic.  Advocates 
voice their views and expect that legislators, their staffs, and other political 
actors will react to their arguments and that collectively, they will craft 
statutory laws.  As a result, legislative advocates have both a role and power 
within the legislative process.  Frequently, they can negotiate with other 
actors and use whatever power they may have to influence legislative texts. 
b. Tactics Used by Modifiers 
The tactics used by Indian advocates often reflected their motivations 
for using a modification strategy and the kind of bill on which they chose to 
advocate.  Indian advocates used two different tactics depending on the kind 
of Indian-related bill on which they advocated.  Each of these tactics further 
shows how legislative advocates perceive the legislative process as a 
lawmaking enterprise and an opportunity to shape the substantive content of 
the law. 
One tactic of Indian modifiers was to engage in targeted advocacy on a 
bill.  This tactic appeared most frequently when Indian advocates sought 
changes to general bills that included provisions affecting Indians.  Indian 
advocates often targeted their advocacy on a particular program or provisions 
within the general bill.  For example, the National Congress of American 
Indians (“NCAI”), the oldest, largest, and most representative American 
Indian and Alaska Native organization, requested very specific amendments 
 
 208. For a detailed discussion of proponents employing an incremental law reform strategy, see 
Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1191–92, 1194–95 
(recounting the strategy used by tribal advocates to obtain limited jurisdiction over non-Indian 
perpetrators of intimate violence in the Violence Against Women Act of 2013). 
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to the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981.209  The Older Americans 
Act Amendments of 1981 sought to extend the Older Americans Act of 1965 
for an additional three years and clarify the functions of the Commissioner 
on Aging and other aspects of federal programs and assistance for older 
Americans.210  NCAI focused its advocacy on Title VI, which provides grants 
to tribal organizations to assist older Indians.  It wanted certain barriers to 
participation for Indian elders removed, including: (1) a community to have 
at least seventy-five elders before it could receive Title VI benefits, (2) the 
eligibility age requirements, which were too high to allow the majority of 
Indian elders to qualify for the program, and (3) the dietary recommendations 
because they differed so drastically from traditional diets that they created 
emotional and health conflicts for Indian elders.211  The Committee 
responded to some of the NCAI’s requests by amending Title VI to change 
the definition of Indians to be served from “Indians aged 60 and over” to 
“older Indians” and striking the requirement that a state’s Title III allocation 
be reduced by an amount attributable to the number of Indians to be served.212  
The NCAI asked for these changes because the circumstances of Indian 
elders differ from those of the general population and it wanted to educate 
Congress about these differences.213  The Committee Report on the bill also 
suggested that the Commissioner on Aging take note of the historical 
differences in dietary practices between Indian and non-Indian populations 
to allow for some flexibility for the dietary preferences of the Indian 
population.214  These amendments appear to respond directly to the concerns 
raised by the NCAI, but it is not clear whether Congress’ enactment of a very 
similar bill with identical changes to Title VI satisfied all the concerns raised 
by NCAI.215  As this case shows, even when Congress does not adopt all the 
amendments proposed by Indian nations and organizations, they may 
influence the bill by shaping its content.  Without NCAI’s input, Congress 
 
 209. Hearing on H.R. 3046 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on 
Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong. 107 (1981) (statement of Ronald Andrade, National Congress of 
American Indians). 
 210. H.R. 3046, 97th Cong. (1982). 
 211. See Hearing on H.R. 3046 Before the Subcomm. on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Educ. 
and Labor, supra note 209. 
 212. H.R. REP. NO. 97–70, at 3 (1981). 
 213. NCAI asked for a lower age requirement because “[t]he median Indian lifespan is 
approximately six years less than the rest of the Nation’s population.”  Hearing on H.R. 3046 Before 
the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, supra note 209 at 107.  
Similarly, the NCAI cited the isolated, rural locations of most Indian reservations as contributing to 
the inability of tribes to meet the numerical requirements for hosting a program.  Id. 
 214. H.R. REP. NO. 97–70, supra note 212, at 3. 
 215. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981, S. 1086, 97th Cong. (1981). 
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probably would not have amended the Older Americans Act Amendments of 
1981, and the provisions problematic for Indian elders would have remained.   
The NCAI’s advocacy on the Older Americans Act Amendments of 
1981 demonstrates how advocates may use targeted advocacy to shape 
provisions in general bills.  It illustrates how advocates viewed specific 
provisions of the bill as important to them and engaged in advocacy even 
though they were not major stakeholders on the bill.  Indian advocates saw 
the bill as an opportunity to use targeted advocacy to focus on the provisions 
of the bill that affected their communities.  They sought to improve the 
content of a general policy that affected a significant portion of the American 
Indian population and added their voices to the mix of advocacy on the bill.  
Indian modifiers used advocacy to educate members of Congress about issues 
specific to them and to shape the provisions in the bill with the most impact 
on them. 
Indian advocates used a different tactic when they advocated on pan-
tribal bills.216  Pan-tribal bills differ from general bills because Indian nations 
and their citizens are the major stakeholders on pan-tribal bills, which are 
designed to shape federal Indian policy for all tribes.  In advocating on pan-
tribal bills, Indian modifiers employed a modification strategy to negotiate 
with the federal government, other Indian advocates, and sometimes, the 
states, over the direction of federal Indian policy.  Indian advocates did not 
necessarily target certain provisions of the bill like they did when seeking to 
modify a general bill, but often suggested changes throughout the bill and/or 
tried to refocus the bill to shift federal Indian law and policy in a direction 
favorable to them.  Their negotiations with members of Congress were also 
more dialectic on pan-tribal bills than general bills.  Sometimes members of 
Congress solicited input from Indian advocates and invited them to suggest 
changes to pan-tribal bills.217  Committees also tended to consult with Indian 
nations and advocates throughout the legislative process on pan-tribal bills. 
 
 216. See, e.g., Indian Needs Assessment and Program Evaluation Act of 1999, S. 612, 106th 
Cong. (1999); The Indian Federal Recognition Administrative Procedures Act of 1999: Hearing on 
S. 611 before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000); A bill to amend the American 
Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999); The Indian Tribal Development Consolidated 
Funding Act of 2000: Hearing on S. 2052 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 
(2000); Indian Health Care Improvement Act Reauthorization of 2000, S. 2526, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 217. See, e.g., A bill to amend the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994: 
Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999); The 
Indian Tribal Development Consolidated Funding Act of 2000: Hearing on S. 2052 Before the S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (2000).  
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The National American Indian Housing Council’s (“NAIHC”) 
advocacy218 on the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-
Determination Act (“NAHASDA”) Amendments of 2000 illustrates how 
Indian advocates use modification strategies to negotiate federal Indian 
policy with the federal government.219  The NAHASDA Amendments of 
2000 proposed to improve delivery of housing assistance to Indian tribes in 
a manner that recognized tribal self-governance.220  Senators Inouye and 
Campbell introduced the bill after receiving complaints from tribes about the 
implementation of the 1996 Native American Housing Assistance and Self-
Determination Act.221  The NAIHC perceived the legislative process as a way 
to negotiate improvements in federal Indian housing policy and the 
implementation of NAHASDA.  It saw its testimony as “a beginning for 
discussions on NAHASDA.”222  The NAIHC made multiple 
recommendations for improving the implementation of NAHASDA in its 
reauthorization, including, inter alia, defining the terms used in the bill, 
restricting the authority given to the Secretary to conduct audits, authorizing 
adequate funding for the block grant program, limiting the time frame for 
performance agreements, and revising the environmental review provisions 
to allow tribes to make mistakes and not lose their funding.223  The NAIHC 
sought both to focus the bill on improving the implementation of 
NAHASDA, which many tribal governments had found lacking, and to make 
detailed suggestions about specific provisions of the proposed bill.  After the 
hearing, the Committee submitted a long list of specific questions to NAIHC 
about different proposed provisions in the bill.  The Committee’s request for 
more information from NAIHC indicated its willingness to consult NAIHC 
on and negotiate with tribal governments over the content of the bill.  The 
Committee amended the bill before reporting it out and included several 
amendments responsive to NAIHC’s concerns.224  The Senate passed the 
amended bill, but it did not move forward in the House.  Many of the 
 
 218. The National American Indian Housing Council “represents the unique and historic 
interests of tribes and tribally designed housing entities on American Indian and Alaskan Native 
housing issues.”  NATIONAL AMERICAN INDIAN HOUSING COUNCIL, NAIHC’s Advocacy Mission, 
http://naihc.net/advocacy/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).  
 219. S. 400, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 220. Id. 
 221. The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2000: 
Hearing on S. 400 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 222. Id. at 21 (statement of Carl Chester, National American Indian Housing Council). 
 223. Id. at 26–28. 
 224. For example, the Committee appears to have responded to the NAIHC’s comments by 
amending the bill to allow the Secretary to waive the requirements of the environmental review 
process in certain limited circumstances, change the auditing authority of the Secretary, and 
authorize more funding for certain tribes.  S. REP. NO. 106–145 at 4–7 (1999). 
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NAIHC’s recommendations, however, were later adopted and enacted in the 
American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000.225   
NAIHC’s approach to the hearing on the NAHASDA Amendments of 
2000 demonstrates how advocacy groups see the legislative process as an 
interactive and dynamic negotiation over federal Indian policy.  It reveals 
how Indian advocates used the multiple stages of the legislative process to 
create a dialogue with members of Congress over NAHASDA and its 
implementation, which ultimately led Congress to amend the Act to serve 
Indian communities better.  Tribal governments raised concerns about the 
lack of implementation of NAHASHA, which encouraged Senator Inouye 
and Senator Campbell to draft the NAHASDA Amendments of 2000.226  
NAIHC continued the dialogue with members of Congress about the bill 
during the next stage of the legislative process.  NAIHC testified on the bill, 
knowing that it may not move forward but seeing it as an opportunity to 
educate members of Congress, shape the bill’s text, and influence federal 
Indian policy more broadly by reiterating the importance of Indian self-
determination in housing.  The Committee listened to the NAIHC’s concerns.  
It then further engaged with the NAIHC on the bill’s provisions by asking 
NAIHC for its input through a series of questions, and finally amended the 
bill in response to this series of interactions.227  Like other legislative 
advocates,228 Indian advocates strategically used the stages of the legislative 
process to engage members of Congress and to negotiate substantive 
amendments to federal Indian housing policy through a series of interactive 
exchanges with legislators.  
c. Arguments Made by Modifiers 
Modifiers’ separate agenda—to shape the proposed law in a way that 
better responds to their interests—informs the arguments they make and 
demonstrates the role that law plays in legislative advocacy.  As the examples 
in the previous sections show, modifiers focus on shaping a legislative text 
in ways that respond to their concerns.  Modifiers make different kinds of 
arguments in their efforts to do this.  Consistent with the behavior of 
 
 225. Pub. L. No. 106-569, § 503, 114 Stat. 2961–62 (amending NAHASDA to, inter alia, permit 
the Secretary to waive certain environmental review requirements under specified conditions and to 
revise the audit, review, and hearing provisions).  Congress also enacted some amendments to 
NAHASDA in the Omnibus Indian Advancement Act. Pub. L. No. 106–568, § 1003, 114 Stat. 
2925–27. 
 226. The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2000: 
Hearing on S. 400 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of 
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell). 
 227. Id.  
 228. King, et al., supra note 52, at 1214. 
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legislative advocates more generally,229 Indian modifiers drew on policy 
arguments in advocating for changes in the proposed law.  Indian modifiers, 
however, did not use policy arguments in the same ways as proponents and 
opponents.   
Significantly, modifiers did not rely solely on political arguments.  
Legal arguments also emerged as integral to Indian advocates’ efforts to 
shape proposed laws.  Consistent with their focus on changing provisions in 
the legislative text, Indian advocates frequently used legal frames and 
arguments in their advocacy. 
i. Policy arguments 
Political science studies have well documented the kinds of policy 
arguments made by proponents and opponents.230  Indian modifiers made 
arguments similar to proponents and opponents, but not in the same ways that 
opponents or proponents do.  
Indian modifiers borrowed arguments from both proponents and 
opponents.  Their use of these arguments complicates existing 
understandings of how advocates argue about the status quo.  Recall that 
existing studies show that proponents argue for the status quo and opponents 
argue against the status quo.231  The kinds of arguments that legislative 
advocates make then flow from their position on the status quo.  For example, 
proponents make arguments about how the bill benefits society, is not 
prohibitively expensive or is worth the cost, and will meet its objectives.232 
Modifiers’ use of policy arguments did not easily fit within this existing 
model of for and against the status quo.  Often Indian modifiers highlighted 
the drawbacks of a proposed law not because they wanted the bill defeated 
but because they wanted Congress to amend the bill to improve it.233  
Consider the Osage Tribal Council’s advocacy on H.R. 4926, discussed 
 
 229. See supra Part II. 
 230. See supra Part II. 
 231. See supra Part II. 
 232. See supra Part II.   
 233. For an example of this, see the discussion of the advocacy of the Three Affiliated Tribes of 
the Fort Berthold Reservation, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River 
Reservation in Wyoming, and the Council of Energy Resource Tribes on the Federal Energy and 
Mineral Resources Act of 1982.  See infra Part III.c.ii.  In that case, the Indian advocates supported 
the bill, but they used arguments highlighting its drawbacks to encourage members of Congress to 
amend it.  See also Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments: Joint Hearing on S. 1586, S. 1315, 
and H.R. 3181 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs. and the H. Comm. on Res., 106th Cong. 56–57 
(1999) (statement of Delmar “Poncho” Bigby, Indian Land Working Group) (testifying that the bill 
needed to be amended because it completely ignored the needs of individuals and did not provide 
any options for individuals to consolidate land). 
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previously, as an example of this.234  The Osage Tribal Council opposed the 
bill and made arguments about its unfairness to encourage legislators to 
support amendments to it.  The Osage case demonstrates how Indian 
modifiers were not for the status quo like opponents but were using 
arguments similar to opponents to negotiate for changes to the bill.  Like 
proponents, Indian modifiers wanted changes in the law, but they did not like 
the ones in the proposed bill. Rather than accept the proposed changes to the 
law in the bill, Indian modifiers suggested amendments to the bill that 
Congress could enact to improve both the bill and existing law.  In short, 
these Indian modifiers wanted the status quo changed, just not in the way the 
bill proposed.  
Other Indian modifiers wanted to have a say about the status quo that 
was about to be created by the bill.  For example, Indian tribes and the 
Council on Energy Resource Tribes testified on the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982235 because they wanted to ensure that tribal governments were 
treated like states in any comprehensive program that Congress developed to 
deal with nuclear waste storage.236  These Indian advocates were advocating 
to have a say in the status quo to be established in the bill because it was the 
first time Congress had created a comprehensive program for dealing with 
nuclear waste storage. 
These examples indicate that while Indian modifiers frequently made 
policy arguments in their advocacy, they did not use these arguments in the 
same way as proponents or opponents.  Nor did Indian modifiers fit neatly 
into categorizations of legislative advocates as either for or against the status 
quo.  Rather, Indian modifiers were using policy arguments in more nuanced 
and strategic ways. 
ii. Legal Arguments 
Indian advocates did not rely solely on policy arguments.  The law often 
played a key role in Indian advocates’ arguments.  Indian modifiers, 
proponents, and opponents all used legal frames and arguments in their 
advocacy.237  Indian advocates frequently invoked key tenets of existing 
 
 234. See supra Part V. 
 235. H.R. 3809, 97th Cong. (1982). 
 236. Radioactive Waste Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 1993, H.R. 2800, H.R. 2840, H.R. 2881, 
and H.R. 3809 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Interior and 
Insular Affs., 97th Cong. (1981) (statement of the Council of Energy Resources Tribes, the Yakima 
Indian Nation, and the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of Ft. Hall, ID). 
 237. Indian nations and organizations opposing the Steelhead Trout Protection Act heavily relied 
on legal frames and arguments to persuade members of Congress to protect their tribal sovereignty 
and treaty fishing rights.  See infra Part V.  My previous research details how Indian proponents 
have used legal arguments and frames to protect their tribal sovereignty, build their institutions, and 
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federal Indian law, including tribal sovereignty,238 self-determination,239 the 
trust relationship,240 and treaties.241  They also made very specific legal 
arguments about how a particular proposed law would undermine existing 
federal laws.242   
Indian advocates used the law in varying ways across subject matters 
and kinds of Indian-related bills.  Indian advocates often employed the law 
to argue for improvements to general bills that would harm their interests.243  
They seemed to be utilizing the law to educate members of Congress about 
the government-to-government relationship between the federal government 
 
maintain control over their lands and natural resources.  Carlson, Making Strategic Choices, supra 
note 16, at 939; Carlson, Lobbying as a Strategy for Tribal Resilience, supra note 19, at 1177–20. 
 238. See, e.g., Steelhead Trout Protection Act Part I: Hearing on S. 874 Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 97th Cong. (1981). 
 239. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 43 (1999) (statement of Reid Chambers) (raising concerns 
about the Office of Trust Fund Management not honoring self-determination); Id. at 42 (statement 
of Anna Whiting Sorrell) (requesting that Committee consider the impact of the proposed legislation 
on self-determination, which is an effective Indian policy); Business Development on Indian Lands: 
Hearing on S. 613 and S. 614 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999) 
(statement of Harold D. Salway, President, Oglala Sioux Tribe) (referring to tribal self-
determination by emphasizing the capacity of tribes to manage their own affairs). 
 240. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. 50–51 (1999) (statement of Reid Chambers, Assiniboine 
and Sioux Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation) (discussing the importance of the trust responsibility 
and its relationship to treaties); Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 
2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of 
Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); Id. at 128 (statement of 
Saul Goodman, Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY). 
 241. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 50–51 (1999) (statement of Reid Chambers, Assiniboine and 
Sioux Tribes of the Ft. Peck Reservation); Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: 
Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement 
of Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); id. at 128 (statement 
of Saul Goodman, Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY). 
 242. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 40–41 (1999) (statement of Anna Whiting Sorrell, 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation) (arguing that current 
implementation of the Trust Reform Act of 1994 conflicts with the Indian Self-determination Act 
of 1995 and forestalls implementation of tribal self-determination); Internet Gaming: Hearing on 
S. 692 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 66–68 (1999) (statement of Richard 
Williams, Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians) (arguing that the bill amends 
IGRA in a harmful manner that would disrupt the delicate balance between tribes and states and 
recommending that Class II gaming be exempted from the prohibition on internet gaming). 
 243. See, e.g., Trust Fund Management Reform Act: Hearing on S. 1587 and S. 1589 Before the 
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 40–41 (1999) (statement of Anna Whiting Sorrell, 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation); Internet Gaming: Hearing 
on S. 692 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 106th Cong. 68–70 (1999) (statement of Richard 
Williams, Chairman, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Chippewa Indians). 
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and Indian nations, as well as raising concerns about how specific proposed 
laws could impact existing federal laws. 
The advocacy of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold 
Reservation, the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River 
Reservation in Wyoming and the Council of Energy Resource Tribes on the 
Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982 illustrates how Indian 
advocates employed the law to persuade legislators to improve a proposed 
bill.  The Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982 sought to 
improve laws related to the obligations of lessees of federal and Indian oil 
and gas leases, to clarify the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to 
maintain a proper system of royalty management, accounting and collection, 
and to encourage enforcement practices necessary to ensure proper collection 
of revenues.244  The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 
the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes of the Wind River Reservation in 
Wyoming, and the Council of Energy Resource Tribes wanted Congress to 
eliminate Section 20 of the Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 
1982, which required tribes to pay up to one percent of their royalties into a 
fund for royalty accounting services.245  Indian advocates employed legal 
frames and arguments to persuade members of Congress to amend the bill.  
They argued that Section 20 violated a fundamental tenet of federal Indian 
law—the trust responsibility that exists among the tribes and the federal 
 
 244. The Federal Royalty Management Act of 1982, S. 2305, 97th Cong. (1982).  The bill 
responded to concerns about the archaic nature of the royalty accounting system and thefts of oil 
and gas from federal and Indian lease sites that lacked adequate security measures.  The Department 
of the Interior had appointed a Commission on Fiscal Accountability of the Nation’s Energy 
Resources (commonly known as the Linowes Commission, after its Chairman, David F. Linowes), 
which conducted a thorough investigation.  The draft bill included many of the recommendations 
made by the Linowes Commission. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing 
on S. 2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 297th Cong. (1982). 
 245. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S. 
Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of Patricia Brown, Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation); Id. at 128 (statement of Saul Goodman, 
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY); Id. at 138 (statement of Ed 
Gabriel, Council of Energy Resource Tribes).  Other tribes supported these efforts as well.  
Mailgram from Norman Hollow, Chairman of the Ft. Peck Tribal Executive Board to Senator John 
Melcher (May 11, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); Letter from Marvin Sonosky to Senator 
James McClure (May 24, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative 
Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); Comments of the Blackfeet Tribe 
on S. 2305 (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); Mailgram from Allen Rowland, Chairman, Northern 
Cheyenne Tribal Council to Senator Melcher (May 10, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, 
The Center for Legislative Archives, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305); 
Mailgram from John Windy Boy, Chairman, Chippewa-Cree Business Committee to Senator 
Melcher (May 10, 1982) (on file with the National Archives, The Center for Legislative Archives, 
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, files on S. 2305). 
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government.246  They emphasized how problems with the royalty 
management system, which allowed oil companies not to pay royalties to the 
tribes for many years, breached the federal government’s duty to act as a 
trustee and protect Indian interests in their oil and gas.247  They argued that it 
was contrary to the government’s trust responsibility and unfair for the 
government to now make the tribes pay for the administration of a program 
that had mismanaged leases on tribal trust land to their substantial financial 
detriment.248  Congress responded to tribal concerns by deleting Section 20 
before incorporating the amended version of S. 2305 into H.R. 5121, the 
 
 246. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 2305 Before the S. 
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 130 (1982) (statement of Saul Goodman, 
Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY) (“[I]t would be a breach of 
fiduciary duty to use tribal funds to pay for the royalty accounting on nontribal leases, and in this 
regard they are somewhat concerned by the manner in which section 20 is now drafted”); Id. at 403 
(statement of Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation) (“[Section 
20] should be deleted.  Its effect is to exact a charge from Indians for the fulfillment of the United 
States’ basic governmental and trust responsibilities.  The treaties and statutes under which trust 
responsibilities were established do not contemplate such a charge.  Surely, no segment of the 
population, never mind one of the neediest, should be directly charged for basic governmental 
services . . . .”). 
 247. Id. at 140 (statement of Ed Gabriel, Council of Energy Resource Tribes) (“The DOI, as 
trustee to the tribes has the responsibility to effectively protect the tribes’ interests in Indian-owned 
resources held in trust.  In regard to minerals management, it is clear that the Department, not the 
tribes, has failed over the years in carrying out that responsibility.  It is also clear that the companies 
operating on Indian lands have too often failed to carry out their responsibilities as lessees, yet now 
we see the financial burden of correcting the Department’s problems being placed on the tribes 
through Section 20.”).  They also informed Congress of the extent of the theft and underreporting 
of royalties that had already occurred. Id. at 128–29 (statements of Saul Goodman, Shoshone and 
Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River Reservation, WY) (noting that the tribes had to recover over 
$1 million in previously unpaid royalties after they investigated allegations of theft and 
underreporting of royalties on their reservation). 
 248. Id. at 129 (statement of Saul Goodman, Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, Wind River 
Reservation, WY) (“Section 20 would require the Indian tribe to contribute up to 1 percent of their 
royalties to a fund to be used for royalty accounting purposes.  In effect, the tribe would be required 
to pay the fund for the royalty management services of the Department of the Interior, at least to 
contribute a pro rata share.  It is the view of the tribes that in light of what they have discovered 
during this investigation and what the Linowes Commission has concluded, that is, that these leases 
have been seriously mismanaged for years, the tribes do feel it is simply unfair to be asked to pay 
for these services.  The services have been inadequate.  The tribes have been required to put out a 
lot of money to bring the lease accounts into order now.  The tribes have no assurance that they can 
stop investing, that they ought to stop investing their money now, but rather they must keep a careful 
eye to insure that things will be taken care of properly in the future, and in addition, although they 
have recovered substantial royalties, there are certain problems that occurred in the past that they 
may never be able to fully recover their losses for.  Under these circumstances, the tribes simply 
feel that it would be unfair to be asked to pay the burden for these services that in the past have been 
so woefully inadequate.”); id. at 139–40 (statement of Ed Gabriel, Council of Energy Resource 
Tribes) (noting that Section 20 would place a substantial burden on Indian tribes and questioning 
the equity of that burden). 
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Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982.249  Congress 
subsequently enacted the amended version of H.R. 5121.250 
Indian advocacy on the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act 
of 1982 is instructive because it shows how Indian advocates employed legal 
frames and arguments in negotiating with legislators over the text.  It 
reiterates that legislative advocacy is about the creation of legal texts and 
demonstrates how Indian advocates engaged with legislators to craft the law.  
Moreover, the response of legislators to legal frames and arguments used by 
Indian advocates indicates that these arguments may have some influence on 
legislators and that the law may matter more to legislators than previous 
studies have suggested.251 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF A LEGAL APPROACH FOR STUDYING LEGISLATIVE 
ADVOCACY 
The implications of this research for advocacy studies, interest group 
studies, and legal scholars are significant.  In a world in which advocates 
increasingly influence legislation and frequently draft laws, legal scholars, 
political scientists, and advocacy scholars need to develop more nuanced 
approaches to understanding the role advocates play and how they use the 
law in legislative lawmaking.252  My research contributes to this larger project 
by expanding existing understandings of advocate behavior and emphasizing 
how advocates employ the law in legislative lawmaking. 
This Article presents an innovative new approach to studying legislative 
advocacy from a legal perspective.  It improves upon existing political 
science approaches for understanding how advocates behave by emphasizing 
how legislative advocacy occurs within and responds to an interactive and 
dynamic legislative process.  It views the legislative process as a lawmaking 
enterprise and highlights the importance of the substantive content of its final 
product, statutory law, to legislative advocates and their behavior. 
My legal approach to studying legislative advocacy combines 
theoretical and methodological insights from political science and legal 
literatures.  It starts from the premise that advocates are strategic actors 
 
 249. H.R. 5121, 97th Cong. (1982); see also S. Rep. No. 97-512 (1982) (indicating that the 
Committee deleted the provision requiring tribal payment for royalty management services prior to 
reporting out the bill).  The Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation actually 
preferred H.R. 5121 to S. 2305. Federal Energy and Mineral Resources Act of 1982: Hearing on S. 
2305 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong. 400 (1982) (statement of 
Patricia Brown, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation). 
 250. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-451, 96 Stat. 2447. 
 251. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 145; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 145–48 (not 
discussing legal arguments); Rubin, supra note 29, at 522. 
 252. Hasen, supra note 3, at 194. 
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seeking prescriptive goals within an interactive legislative process.  It takes 
useful insights from the political science literature on lobbyist strategies, 
positions, and tactics and integrates them with legal scholars’ 
conceptualization of the legislative process as a lawmaking enterprise.253  
Borrowing from sociolegal studies of judicial advocacy, I emphasize how 
legislative advocacy is about the substance of the law and how legislative 
advocates employ legal frames and arguments in the legislative process.254  
By examining the various positions advocates take and the arguments they 
make throughout the legislative process, my approach facilitates an in-depth 
exploration of how advocates negotiate legislative lawmaking and interact 
with legislators to craft the law through this dynamic, discursive process. 
My analysis of American Indian advocacy serves as an illustrative 
example of the utility and richness of this approach.  It uncovers two key 
insights about legislative advocacy that earlier approaches overlook.  First, 
my account shows that advocates perceive legislative advocacy to be about 
modifying the substantive content of a proposed law.  Recent political science 
studies discount the importance of a bill’s substantive content by 
emphasizing binary win/loss advocacy strategies.  In contrast, my account 
reveals that legislative advocates can—and frequently do—pursue a third 
strategy: to modify the substantive text of a proposed law.  Indian advocates 
engaged in modification strategies, seeking to shape provisions in the 
legislative text, on the majority—53%—of the bills in this study.255  As 
modifiers, Indian advocates advocated broadly, frequently providing input on 
general laws as well as pan-tribal and tribe specific laws.  Their advocacy 
covered a variety of subject matters from health, housing, and nuclear waste 
policy to water rights settlements and mineral resource development. 
My data reveal that legislative advocates take a wider range of and more 
flexible positions on proposed bills than previous political science studies 
have suggested and that they use these positions strategically in their efforts 
to change the law.256  The positions taken by Indian advocates varied from 
proponents strongly for the bill to opponents strongly against, with several 
options in between in which advocates sought to modify the legislative text.  
Figure 5 displays the range of positions that legislative advocates take when 
advocating on a proposed law.   
 
Figure 5: Continuum of Positions of Indian Witnesses Advocating on a 
Bill 
 
 253. See supra Part III. 
 254. See supra Part III.  
 255. See supra Part V. 
 256. See supra Part II. 
  




wider range of advocacy positions provides unique insights into advocate 
behavior.  It enables scholars to see aspects of legislative advocacy 
overlooked by existing political science studies, which have emphasized 
legislative advocacy as political rather than legal work.257  In contrast, my 
account of Indian advocacy highlights how Indian advocates emphasize the 
creation of legal texts in their advocacy and demonstrates how they use the 
law in shaping these texts.  Focusing on the text enabled Indian advocates to 
interact with legislators to shape the law.  As advocacy on the Older 
Americans Act Amendments of 1981, the Federal Energy and Mineral 
Resources Act of 1982, and the NAHASDA Amendments of 2000 shows, 
Indian advocates frequently educated members of Congress on how existing 
laws affected and could be improved to better serve the needs of Indian 
country by arguing for changes to specific provisions in proposed laws.258   
Indian advocates often acted strategically in taking positions on and 
making arguments about proposed laws.  Indian advocates frequently used 
their position on a bill to negotiate legislative texts and were open to shifting 
their positions as they interacted with legislators to craft laws.  Consider how 
the Osage Tribal Council and Tohono O’odham Nation navigated the 
legislative process.259  Both tribes used their positions to negotiate for 
provisions in proposed laws more responsive to their needs.  By uncovering 
these interactions among legislative advocates and legislators, my account 
validates existing descriptive theories and studies that portray the legislative 
process as dynamic and interactive.  As a result, it produces a more accurate 
description of how advocates treat the legislative process as a lawmaking 
enterprise.260  
 
 257. See supra Part II. 
 258. See supra Part IV. 
 259. See supra Part IV. 
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Second, my account of Indian advocacy emphasizes that legislative 
advocacy is legal work.  Recognizing modifiers and highlighting their role 
within the legislative process illuminates the legal aspects of the legislative 
process because modifiers are all about shaping the content of the proposed 
law.  Indian modifiers often targeted provisions of bills or used the legislative 
process to negotiate and shape federal Indian policy more generally.   
My examination of Indian advocacy also reveals that Indian advocates 
perceived the law to be an important part of their advocacy.  Indian 
proponents, opponents, and modifiers frequently relied on legal frames, 
especially those central to federal Indian law, and legal arguments to shape 
proposed laws affecting their interests.  While some Indian advocates made 
cogent arguments about how proposed laws would undermine existing ones, 
others used wider legal frames, such as the trust relationship between tribal 
and federal governments, to educate members of Congress about their 
sovereign status as governments and to justify their requests for changes to 
proposed laws. 
A few final observations suggest the broader implications of this legal 
approach for advocacy studies, interest group studies, and legal scholars.  
First, my research indicates that legal scholars need to rethink their reliance 
on political science studies of legislative advocacy.  A political science 
framework underemphasizes the interactive and legal aspects inherent in the 
legislative process.  Congress is the primary author of federal law and, as this 
study shows, should be viewed as potentially the most powerful legal 
institution in the United States.261  Overlooking how legislative advocates 
interact with legislators to craft statutory laws leaves legal scholars and 
advocates with a limited view of the lawmaking process.  It undermines their 
ability to develop law reform strategies and prescriptive theories to improve 
the law. 
To facilitate scholars in rethinking legislative advocacy, this Article 
presents an innovative, mixed-method approach for studying legislative 
advocacy that produces richer and more accurate descriptions of how 
advocates behave and use the law in legislative lawmaking. My account of 
Indian advocacy demonstrates how legislative advocacy extends beyond 
proponents and opponents by describing how legislative advocates 
frequently act as modifiers, seeking to shape the law.  Modification strategies 
enabled Indian advocates to participate widely in the lawmaking process.  
Indian modifiers used the legislative process to educate members of Congress 
on a wide variety of subject matters and kinds of bills.  This broader 
description of legislative advocacy expands on existing studies by 
 
 261. Rudesill, supra note 13, at 700. 
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uncovering how advocates view the legislative process as an opportunity to 
negotiate legal texts.  It also documents how advocates attempt to shape the 
law even when they are not major participants or stakeholders on a proposed 
bill.262  Indian modifiers often behaved strategically through the positions 
they took even when they were not considered major stakeholders on a 
proposed law.  My legal approach, thus, devises a way for scholars to develop 
more accurate descriptions of legislative advocacy by recognizing that the 
legislative process is an interactive, lawmaking enterprise widely used by 
legislative advocates to craft statutory laws. 
A second important implication of my account is that it indicates that 
scholars and advocates need to think more carefully and critically about how 
legislative advocates act strategically to negotiate the legislative process 
through the positions they take.  The widespread use of modification 
strategies by Indian advocates suggests that legislative advocates see the 
legislative process as negotiable and relational.263 Contrary to recent political 
science studies,264 legislative advocates do not always take binary or fixed 
positions but frequently adapt their positions throughout the process in 
response to their interactions with legislators and other political actors.  My 
account, thus, expands on recent studies of how legislative advocates act 
strategically by documenting how, when, and why legislative advocates 
adapt their positions throughout the legislative process in response to the 
opportunities and constraints that arise.265 Importantly, it shows how Indian 
modifiers sought to create their own opportunities to change the law through 
the positions they took and the arguments they made about specific 
provisions in a bill.  Consider the sophisticated strategy used by the Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation on Federal Energy and 
Mineral Resources Act of 1982 as an example.  The Tribes supported the 
general goal of the bill to improve oversight of leasing of federal lands, but 
they used the bill as an opportunity to address particular problems plaguing 
the leasing of tribal lands and drew heavily on legal arguments to prevent 
Congress from enacting sections that would further deprive tribes of revenues 
generated from the leasing of their lands.266  Accounts that do not consider 
the dynamic, interactive nature of the legislative process may overlook or 
miss much of the strategic behavior that legislative advocates engage in 
throughout the legislative process. 
 
 262. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 3. 
 263. ZIV, supra note 53, at 212–13. 
 264. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; BURSTEIN, supra note 39, at 115. 
 265. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 110–13. 
 266. See supra Part IV. 
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Third, my findings may have significant implications for how scholars 
and advocates think about the power groups have and how they exercise it 
within the legislative process. Indian modifiers frequently leveraged what 
power they had through their positions and arguments.  They were able to 
leverage their power more broadly than one would have expected possible 
for a group that has almost no electoral clout and few political resources.267  
Yet, Indian advocates leveraged their positions to shape the content of 
proposed laws even when they were not major stakeholders on a bill.  For 
example, even though Indian elders constitute a very small percentage of the 
elderly population in the United States, the NCAI used targeted advocacy on 
the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1981 to improve programs for 
elders in Indian country.268  While determining exactly how and why Indian 
advocates were able to do this is beyond the scope of this Article, it raises 
important questions about how our most accountable lawmaking institution 
interacts with underrepresented groups.  Previous studies have lamented the 
inequalities of the lobbying system,269 but my research suggests that a deeper 
look may reveal that underrepresented groups engage in the legislative 
process more frequently or in different ways than scholars currently think, 
and that Congress sometimes responds to them.270  Future studies could 
reshape how scholars, advocates, and courts think about power and power 
relationships. 
My research also challenges scholars to think more carefully about how 
legislative advocates use the status quo in their arguments and advocacy.  
Scholars have long recognized the force of the status quo as an obstacle to 
legal change in the legislative process.271  Recent political science studies 
have emphasized the status quo as a tool used by opponents to defeat 
proposed legislation.272  My investigation of American Indian advocacy, 
however, calls into question whether these scholars have accurately described 
how legislative advocates use arguments about the status quo.273  Indian 
modifiers frequently sought to challenge the status quo yet made arguments 
that highlighted the negative consequences that would occur if Congress 
 
 267. Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, supra note 16, at 45. 
 268. See supra Part IV. 
 269. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 254-59; SCHLOTZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 6, 
at 311. 
 270. The examples in this study suggest that Indian modifiers frequently used texts to educate 
members of Congress about the unique conditions and needs of Indian country.  Members of 
Congress appeared interested in learning about these needs and responding to them.  A pernicious 
side may exist to this in terms of rent-seeking by lobbyists for specialized interests, but my data 
does not suggest that Indian advocates are engaged in rent-seeking.  
 271. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 140; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 54, at 25. 
 272. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 140. 
 273. See supra Part II. 
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enacted the proposed bill.  These Indian modifiers emphasized the drawbacks 
of the proposed bill not because they were defending the status quo but 
because they wanted Congress to improve the bill to serve the needs of Indian 
country more efficiently and effectively.  My findings, thus, suggest that 
scholars need to pay closer attention to the arguments being made by 
legislative advocates and how they relate to the status quo. 
A final important implication of this research is that it reveals that, 
contrary to recent political science studies deemphasizing legislative 
advocacy as legal work, legislative advocates perceive the law as an 
important aspect of their legislative advocacy.  Indian advocates often used 
the law in their arguments for changes to legislative texts.  In this respect, my 
research expands on existing advocacy studies, which have emphasized how 
and when legislative advocates make policy arguments, by demonstrating 
that legal arguments also play a vital role in legislative lawmaking.   
My research, thus, contributes to a growing literature on how advocates 
use the law in non-judicial settings and suggests that advocacy scholars need 
to think more carefully and critically about how advocates employ the law in 
legislative settings. Contrary to the view that the law matters less in the 
legislative process because legislators respond to policy arguments,274 the 
law mattered to Indian advocates.  They found the law to be a useful tool in 
educating members of Congress about the special government-to-
government relationship between Indian nations and the federal government.  
They employed legal arguments to persuade members of Congress to make 
changes to proposed laws so that they would not undermine existing federal 
laws, treaty rights, or tribal sovereignty.275  The fact that legislative advocates 
take the law and legal arguments seriously as part of their advocacy suggests 
that future studies should pay more attention to the kinds of legal frames and 
arguments that advocates use in legislative settings and evaluate their 
influence on legislators. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legislative advocacy has increased exponentially in the past five decades, yet 
recent scholarship has overlooked the legal aspects of legislative lawmaking.  
This Article responds to this gap in the literature by presenting an innovative, 
mixed-methods approach to studying legislative lawmaking.  My approach 
improves on existing political science studies by emphasizing the legislative 
process as a lawmaking enterprise.  It highlights the importance of the 
substantive content of laws to legislative advocates and their behavior.  The 
 
 274. Rubin, supra note 29, at 522. 
 275. See supra Part V. 
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Article then demonstrates the utility of a legal approach through an 
investigation of American Indian advocacy, which reveals two important 
insights about legislative advocates’ behavior overlooked in previous studies.  
First, my account reveals that legislative advocates perceive legislative 
advocacy as about modifying the substantive content of a proposed law.  It 
shows how Indian advocates engaged in nuanced and sophisticated strategies 
to interact with legislators and other political actors to craft statutory laws.  
Second, my account of Indian advocacy emphasizes that legislative advocacy 
involves legal as well as political work.  Indian advocates regularly used legal 
frames and arguments to educate and persuade legislators. 
